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Andrew Kent* 
Not since the Nixon presidency has the issue of the professional 
neutrality and independence of federal law enforcement from White House 
interference or misuse been such a pressing issue. This Article describes 
the problem, details Congress’s important role in responding to it during 
the 1970s, and makes specific recommendations for Congress today. As 
important background, this Article recounts the abuses of the Hoover era 
at the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), and the ways the Nixon 
White House sought to both impede and corrupt the Department of Justice 
(“DOJ”) and the FBI. It then describes what an engaged Congress looked 
like — the Congress of the 1970s — when it reacted to these abuses by 
helping to develop laws, structures, and norms of law enforcement 
independence and neutrality that served this country well for two 
generations. Drawing both on ideas floated in Congress post-Watergate, 
as well as institutional design features from independent regulatory 
agencies, this Article then suggests a menu of options for a future 
Congress, if it could move beyond gridlock and partisanship, to engage 
again with pressing issues about the White House’s relationship to federal 
law enforcement. Most options I survey here are constitutionally 
uncontroversial. But two options, both of which were proposed by 
reformist senators soon after Watergate, are more aggressive and 
constitutionally problematic: statutory qualifications limiting the range of 
appointees for senior DOJ roles, and a statutory for-cause restriction on 
the President’s ability to remove the FBI Director. After setting out 
arguments for the constitutionality of these proposals, I conclude with a 
menu of concrete policy recommendations for a future Congress that 
wishes to get off the sidelines and again play a constructive role in 
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protecting the country from the abuse of our powerful and essential federal 
law enforcement institutions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Law enforcement infected by political or personal agendas is, or 
should be, the stuff of our nightmares. Any reasonable conception of 
the rule of law requires that law be applied impartially and 
impersonally.1 As the influential Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 
put it, the ideal is “impartial . . . administration of justice,” and “a 
government of laws and not of men.”2 Today, the mission statement of 
the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ” or “Justice Department”) 
promises “to ensure fair and impartial administration of justice.”3 In 
perhaps the most famous distillation of prosecutorial ethics, Attorney 
General Robert Jackson — later Justice Jackson — warned against “the 
most dangerous power of the prosecutor: that he will pick people that 
he thinks he should get, rather than pick cases that need to be 
prosecuted.”4 Law enforcement would then be simply “picking the 
man and then searching the law books, or putting investigators to 
work, to pin some offense on him.”5 “Picking the man” (or woman, or 
group) for personal, political, ideological, racial, or other invidious 
reasons, and then searching for a criminal charge to bring, is a favorite 
tool of all tyrannies. 
For the past two generations, the United States has had a good — 
not perfect, but good — record at the federal level of avoiding this 
fate. Two important judicial institutions — federal courts staffed by 
judges with tenure during good behavior, and juries of citizens6 — 
have helped prevent the misuse of law federal enforcement. But given 
the amount of discretion that escapes external review during the 
investigative and prosecutorial stages, the executive branch itself must 
be structured, staffed, and led in ways that promote fair and impartial 
law enforcement. 
 
 1 See Jeremy Waldron, The Rule of Law, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (June 22, 
2016), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rule-of-law/.  
 2 MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. I, arts. XXIX, XXX.  
 3 About DOJ, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/about (last visited Nov. 2, 
2018).  
 4 Robert H. Jackson, Attorney Gen., Address at the Second Annual Conference of 
U.S. Attorneys: The Federal Prosecutor 4 (Apr. 1, 1940), www.justice.gov/sites/ 
default/files/ag/legacy/2011/09/16/04-01-1940.pdf.  
 5 Id. at 5. 
 6 See U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1-2, cl. 3; id. amend. VI. 
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Especially in the last forty years, the most important federal law 
enforcement organizations, the DOJ and its components, the U.S. 
Attorneys’ offices and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI” or 
“Bureau”), have developed very strong cultures stressing 
professionalism, fairness, impartiality, and nonpartisanship. A key part 
of ensuring that federal law enforcement is not tyrannical has been 
removing as far as possible the influence of political actors on the 
investigation and prosecution of specific cases.7 Thus independence, 
professionalism, and impartiality have been tightly linked.8 In the 
post-Watergate era, both Congress and the executive branch have 
played key roles in establishing and buttressing professionalism and 
impartiality by bolstering independence from the White House. 
But independence of federal law enforcement from political control 
has never been absolute, and there has been wide agreement that it 
should not be. Ever since 1789, the U.S. Attorney General and U.S. 
Attorneys (the top federal prosecutor in each judicial district) have 
been appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the 
Senate, without statutory limits on removal from office.9 The director 
of the FBI has also been an at-will employee, serving at the pleasure of 
the President.10 
Some substantial degree of direct presidential control over the heads 
of the DOJ and the FBI has generally been thought to be required by 
the Constitution. Law enforcement is mentioned expressly in Article 
 
 7 See generally Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, “The U.S. Attorneys Scandal” 
and the Allocation of Prosecutorial Power, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 187, 187-89 (2008) 
(discussing the discharge of eight U.S. Attorneys in order to further the President’s 
partisan agenda). 
 8 See infra notes 23–31 and accompanying text. 
 9 See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92; see also, e.g., 1 S. EXEC. 
JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 29-32 (1789) (recording the Senate acting upon 
nominations for district attorney by President Washington). The creation of the DOJ 
in 1870, with the Attorney General at its head, did not change this. See Act to 
Establish the Department of Justice, ch. 150, § 1, 16 Stat. 162 (1870). Into the 
twentieth century, U.S. Attorneys were referred to as district attorneys or federal 
district attorneys. 
 10 It was not until 1966 that Congress specified that the Attorney General had the 
power to appoint the FBI Director. See Pub. L. No. 89-554, § 4(c), 80 Stat. 378, 616 
(1966) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 532 (2018)). Two years later, Congress gave the 
appointment to the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, but said 
nothing about removal, leaving the director an at-will employee. See Omnibus Crime 
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 1101, 82 Stat. 197, 236 
(codified at 28 U.S.C. 532 note (2018)). Legislation in 1976 fixing the director’s term 
at a non-renewable ten years did not speak to removal. See Crime Control Act of 1976, 
Pub. L. No. 94-503, tit. II, § 203, 90 Stat. 2407, 2427 (codified at 28 U.S.C. 532 note 
(2018)). 
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II, which enjoins the President to “take Care that the Laws be 
faithfully executed”11 and vests “the executive Power” in the 
President.12 Both provisions place law execution power in “the 
president,” not in any other institution or individual,13 but Article II 
also envisions a hierarchical structure with the President at the top, 
executing the laws and protecting the national security through 
subordinate officers and departments.14 It is assumed that the power 
and duty to execute must include an authority to investigate violations 
of the laws and to prosecute violations, civilly and criminally.15 By the 
Article II oath and the Take Care Clause, the President is bound to 
“faithfully execute” the office and the laws.16 New research suggests 
that the original meaning of these twin commands requires the 
President, among other things, to act in a diligent, careful, good faith, 
and impartial manner when executing the laws, for public-spirited 
rather than self-interested or corrupt purposes.17 
The primary law enforcement institutions and actors — the 
Attorney General, DOJ attorneys, the FBI Director, and Bureau 
employees — also have important national security roles,18 and the 
 
 11 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.  
 12 Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.  
 13 E.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 499 
(2010) (“The Constitution requires that a President chosen by the entire Nation 
oversee the execution of the laws.”); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 922 (1997) 
(“The Constitution does not leave to speculation who is to administer the laws 
enacted by Congress.”).  
 14 The President shall nominate, and with the Senate’s advice and consent appoint, 
the principal “Officers of the United States,” and if Congress so provides, appoint 
“inferior Officers,” with or without Senate concurrence. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
The President “may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of 
the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective 
Offices.” Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.  
 15 See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996) (describing 
criminal prosecution as “a core executive constitutional function”); Morrison v. 
Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691 (1988) (“There is no real dispute that the functions 
performed by the independent counsel are ‘executive’ in the sense that they are law 
enforcement functions that typically have been undertaken by officials within the 
Executive Branch.”); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985) (stating that the 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion in criminal and civil cases is a constitutional 
power of the President); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 138-40 (1976) (stating that 
“conducting civil litigation in the courts of the United States for vindicating public 
rights” is a presidential prerogative under Article II).  
 16 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8; id. art. II, § 3. 
 17 See Andrew Kent et al., Faithful Execution and Article II, 132 HARV. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3260593. 
 18 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941 (Dec. 4, 1981), amended 
by Exec. Order No. 13,284 (2003); Exec. Order No. 13,355 (2004); and Exec. Order 
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President has very significant constitutional power to conduct the 
nation’s foreign affairs and protect the national security, personally 
and through at-will subordinates.19 Notwithstanding — or because of 
— all of this presidential power, Congress is given authority under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause to implement — and hence regulate — 
the powers vested in the President and in the United States 
government as a whole.20 
But many specific questions remain unanswered by the 
constitutional text itself, including: Is some independence of law 
enforcement from presidential control constitutionally permissible? If 
so, how much, and what kind? Is some independence constitutionally 
mandatory? These and related questions were uncertain and 
controversial in 1789 and remain so today. 
A. Post-Watergate Norms of Law Enforcement Independence 
Reflecting constitutional uncertainties, it is difficult to precisely 
define the proper role for political oversight of federal law 
enforcement. Even very experienced and sophisticated commentators 
can fall back on generalities.21 But the scandals and debates of the 
Watergate era helped crystallize more specific ideas. Both the negative 
examples set by men like J. Edgar Hoover and Richard Nixon, and the 
positive, reformist efforts by Congress, the press, civil society groups, 
post-Nixon Presidents, and law enforcement leaders, generated more 
precise guidelines or norms that have attracted widespread and lasting 
agreement. Some of these guidelines have been partially embodied in 
law or executive branch orders. Others are norms or conventions that 
have become widely accepted among political and legal elites.22 
Although it could be supplemented, I think the following list of 
guidelines captures many widely-shared views about the presidency 
 
No. 13,470 (2008). 
 19 See, e.g., Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 749-50 (1982); Chi. & S. Air Lines, 
Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 109 (1948).  
 20 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
 21 See, e.g., ELLIOT RICHARDSON, THE CREATIVE BALANCE 27 (1976) (contrasting the 
“proper role of the political process in the shaping of legal policies and the perversion 
of the legal process by political pressure”); Preserving Prosecutorial Independence: Is the 
Department of Justice Politicizing the Hiring and Firing of U.S. Attorneys?: Hearing on S. 
110-10 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 1 (2007) [hereinafter 
Preserving Prosecutorial Independence] (statement of Sen. Charles Schumer) (stating 
that federal prosecutors “must be seen to enforce the rule of law without fear or favor” 
and must be “apolitical”).  
 22 On the definition of norms or conventions, see infra notes 53–56 and 
accompanying text. 
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and federal law enforcement that crystallized in the 1970s. First, the 
politically-accountable head of the executive branch — the President 
— can and indeed should set out the broad parameters of legal and 
enforcement policy for DOJ prosecutors and law enforcement agencies 
like the FBI, because ultimately the President is accountable for the 
faithful execution of the law.23 The Attorney General’s job involves 
such a large element of sensitive policy — in areas ranging from civil 
litigation against the government to federal prison administration to 
immigration to law enforcement priorities — that he or she is properly 
an at-will employee of the President, and hence responsive to the 
public will as well.24 The FBI Director should be much more insulated 
 
 23 See, e.g., Removing Politics from the Administration of Justice: Hearings on S. 2803 
and S. 2978 Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 93d Cong. 87 (1974) [hereinafter Removing Politics Hearing] (statement of 
Robert G. Dixon, Assistant Att’y Gen.) (“The people of this country are concerned 
properly about matters such as organized crime, civil rights, pornography, the death 
penalty, and enforcement of the antitrust laws. These and other areas are legitimate 
issues of public debate and legitimate issues in a Presidential campaign. The President 
should be able to set broad priorities in these and related areas.”). For other 
expressions of this norm, see id. at 17-18 (statement of Hon. Theodore C. Sorenson, 
Former Special Counsel to President Kennedy); id. at 202 (statement of Archibald 
Cox, Williston Professor of Law, Harvard University, and former Special Prosecutor in 
the Department of Justice); AM. BAR ASS’N SPECIAL COMM. TO STUDY FED. LAW ENF’T 
AGENCIES, PREVENTING IMPROPER INFLUENCE ON FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 
37 (1976) [hereinafter ABA REPORT]; Rachel E. Barkow, Clemency and Presidential 
Administration of Criminal Law, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 802, 838-39 (2015); Griffin B. Bell., 
Attorney Gen., Address Before Department of Justice Lawyers 4-5 (Sept. 6, 1978), 
www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2011/08/23/09-06-1978b.pdf [hereinafter 
Bell Address]. 
 24 See, e.g., Removing Politics Hearing, supra note 23, at 18 (statement of Hon. 
Theodore C. Sorenson) (“[The Attorney General] not only enforces Federal law, 
investigates its violations, and prosecutes its violators, but also interprets it for the 
President and other agency heads, represents the government in civil as well as 
criminal cases, offers recommendations and reactions to the executive branch, drafts, 
presents, and reviews legislation, and is concerned with prisons, pardons, paroles, 
narcotics, juvenile delinquency, immigration, community relations, domestic security, 
and judicial vacancies.”). For other expressions of this norm, see id. at 152-53, 157 
(statement of Hon. Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, former Att’y Gen.); ABA REPORT, supra 
note 23, at 33-34, 37; JAMES COMEY, A HIGHER LOYALTY: TRUTH, LIES, AND LEADERSHIP 
106 (2018); Dahlia Lithwick & Jack Goldsmith, Politics as Usual: Why the Justice 
Department Will Never Be Apolitical, SLATE (Mar. 14, 2007, 6:46 PM), 
www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2007/03/politics_as_usual.ht
ml. For codification of this norm, see 28 U.S.C. § 503 (2018) (allowing the President, 
with the advice and consent of the Senate, to appoint the Attorney General, and 
neither stating a term of office nor placing restrictions on removal). Support for this 
norm can also be seen when reforms of the DOJ to protect independence and 
impartiality are proposed, but without any suggestion that the Attorney General 
should be anything but an at-will employee of the President. See, e.g., NAT’L TASK 
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from political control than the Attorney General, operating as 
independently as possible, but nevertheless “responsive[] to the broad 
policies of the Executive Branch.”25 Partisan political considerations, 
personal vendettas or favoritism, financial gain, or self-protection or 
self-dealing should play no role in investigating or prosecuting cases, 
hiring or firing career officials, prosecutors, and law enforcement 
agents, and U.S. Attorneys and FBI Directors.26 The senior leadership 
 
FORCE ON RULE OF LAW & DEMOCRACY, PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 2-3 (2018), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/TaskForceReport_2018
_09_.pdf [hereinafter NAT’L TASK FORCE]; Roadmap for Renewal: Congressional 
Oversight and Legislation to Renew Our Democracy, PROTECT DEMOCRACY, 
https://protectdemocracy.org/roadmap-for-renewal/ (last visited Dec. 27, 2018). 
 25 TEN-YEAR TERM FOR THE FBI DIRECTOR, S. REP. NO. 93-1213, at 2 (1974); see also 
Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Robert S. Mueller, III to be Director of the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation: Hearing on S. 107-514 Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 107th Cong. 87 (2001) [hereinafter Mueller Hearing] (statement of Robert S. 
Mueller, III) (stating that the FBI must be “independent, to pursue its investigations 
without any favor to one political party or the other or to any particular individual, no 
matter how powerful” but that the director should be responsive to the Attorney 
General on “policy matters.”); Nomination of Judge William Steele Sessions to be 
Director of the FBI: Hearing on S. 100-36 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th 
Cong. 10 (1987) [hereinafter Hon. William Sessions Hearing] (statement of Sen. Leahy) 
(stating that an FBI Director has to “walk that fine line between responding to the 
Nation’s political leaders and pursuing the department’s very independent law 
enforcement mission.”); LOUIS J. FREEH, MY FBI: BRINGING DOWN THE MAFIA, 
INVESTIGATING BILL CLINTON, AND FIGHTING THE WAR ON TERROR 38 (2005) (“Integrity 
and independence make or break an FBI Director. The incumbent has to be able to say 
no to the attorney general or even the president if no is the right answer.”); Daphna 
Renan, Presidential Norms and Article II, 131 HARV. L. REV. 2187, 2207-14 (2018). For 
partial codification of this norm, see Crime Control Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-503, 
§ 203, 90 Stat. 2407, 2427 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 532 note (2018)) (giving the FBI 
Director a ten-year term, chosen because it extended beyond any one President’s time 
in office).  
 26 For general statements of this norm, see, for example, Preserving Prosecutorial 
Independence, supra note 21; Removing Politics Hearing, supra note 23, at 15-16 
(statement of Hon. Theodore C. Sorenson); id. at 88 (statement of Robert Dixon); id. 
at 154 (statement of Hon. Nicholas deB. Katzenbach); ABA REPORT, supra note 23, at 
44; NAT’L TASK FORCE, supra note 24, at 2; Bell Address, supra note 23, at 2-3. For 
partial codifications of this norm, see U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL 
PROSECUTION § 9-27.260, https://www.justice.gov/usam/usam-9-27000-principles-
federal-prosecution (“In determining whether to commence or recommend 
prosecution or take other action against a person, the attorney for the government 
should not be influenced by: 1) The person’s race, religion, gender, ethnicity, national 
origin, sexual orientation, or political association, activities, or beliefs; 2) The 
attorney’s own personal feelings concerning the person, the person’s associates, or the 
victim; or 3) The possible affect [sic] of the decision on the attorney’s own 
professional or personal circumstances.”).  
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of the DOJ should take no part in political campaigns.27 The DOJ and 
FBI should never be used by the White House for partisan political 
information gathering or other personally-motivated operations.28 
Decisions about specific investigatory or prosecutorial steps in 
particular criminal cases are almost always best left to career officials 
operating free from political intervention, and supervised by political 
appointees based only on “law and merit” rather than improper 
considerations including “White House approval or influence.”29 
Investigations and prosecutions of senior White House or DOJ officials 
should be conducted so as to minimize conflicts of interest and the 
appearance of or actual improper interference.30 And a President, 
 
 27 See Removing Politics Hearing, supra note 23, at 59-60 (statement of Hon. Arthur 
J. Goldberg, former J., United States Supreme Court); id. at 170 (statement of Hon. 
Ramsey Clark, former Att’y Gen.); ABA REPORT, supra note 23, at 41; NAT’L ACAD. OF 
PUB. ADMIN., WATERGATE: ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT 160-61 
(1974) [hereinafter NAT’L ACADEMY REPORT]; Jackson, supra note 4, at 3-4. 
 28 See, e.g., 119 CONG. REC. 40947 (1973) (statement of Sen. Ervin); id. at 11351 
(statement of Sen. Byrd); id. at 14130 (statement of Sen. Schweiker); Bell Address, 
supra note 23, at 3. See generally FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, MANUAL OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE OPERATIONS AND PROCEDURES, pt. 1, § 1-18.3.2 (“The FBI, like all law 
enforcement agencies, must be perceived by the public as nonpartisan and 
apolitical.”). 
 29 Removing Politics Hearing, supra note 23, at 16 (statement of Theodore C. 
Sorenson); see also Barack Obama, The President’s Role in Advancing Criminal Justice 
Reform, 130 HARV. L. REV. 811, 823 (2017) (“For good reason, particular criminal 
matters are not directed by the President personally but are handled by career 
prosecutors and law enforcement officials who are dedicated to serving the public and 
promoting public safety. The President does not and should not decide who or what 
to investigate or prosecute or when an investigation or prosecution should happen.”); 
Madeline Conway, Key Moments from Wray’s FBI Confirmation Hearing, POLITICO (July 
12, 2017, 11:31 AM EDT), www.politico.com/story/2017/07/12/christopher-wray-
confirmation-hearing-key-moments-240452 (quoting Christopher Wray, nominee for 
FBI Director, stating at his confirmation hearing that “there certainly shouldn’t be any 
discussion between, one-on-one discussion between, the FBI Director and any 
president about how to conduct particular investigations or cases”). For other 
statements of this norm, see Preserving Prosecutorial Independence, supra note 21 
(statement of Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Att’y Gen.); Removing Politics Hearing, supra 
note 23, at 154 (statement of Hon. Nicholas deB. Katzenbach); id. at 168-69 
(statement of Ramsey Clark); ABA REPORT, supra note 23, at 69-73; COMEY, supra note 
24, at 120, 179, 237, 246; NAT’L ACADEMY REPORT, supra note 27, at 160-61; Elena 
Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2357-58 (2001); Barkow, 
supra note 23, at 833-34, 838; Bell Address, supra note 23, at 4-5; Jackson, supra note 
4, at 2. For suggestions that Congress in 28 U.S.C. §§ 516, 547 (2018) has codified the 
rule that the Attorney General and U.S. Attorneys, rather than the President or the 
White House, direct criminal prosecutions, see United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 
456, 464-65 (1996) and United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693-94 (1974).  
 30 See, e.g., Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, tit. VI, § 601, 
  
1936 University of California, Davis [Vol. 52:1927 
acting either directly or through aides, violates his oath of office and 
constitutional duty to faithfully execute the law if he seeks to obstruct 
or defeat duly authorized law enforcement inquiries into his own 
behavior or that of close associates.31 
This post-Watergate elite consensus on principles of federal law 
enforcement independence and neutrality has endured through the 
present day, but is now under pressure. Among the many aspects of 
the candidacy and presidency of Donald Trump that have attracted 
widespread condemnation are his repeated attacks on this consensus. 
Starting from his time as a candidate, Trump has engaged in 
unprecedented and often highly personal attacks on the integrity, 
competence, and independence of the FBI, DOJ, FBI Directors, and 
Attorneys General.32 Starting soon upon taking office, Trump 
repeatedly pressured Attorney General Jefferson Sessions and three 
FBI Directors in highly inappropriate ways.33 Trump fired FBI Director 
 
92 Stat. 1824 (creating the process for appointing and monitoring an independent 
counsel). 
 31 See, e.g., AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT ADOPTED BY THE 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, art. I (1974), 
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/articles-impeachment-adopted-the-
house-representatives-committee-the-judiciary; Law Professor Letter on President’s 
Article II Powers, PROTECT DEMOCRACY (June 4, 2018), https://protectdemocracy.org/ 
law-professor-article-ii/.  
 32 Some of the voluminous evidence supporting this statement is compiled in 
NOAH BOOKBINDER ET AL., CITIZENS FOR RESPONSIBILITY AND ETHICS IN WASHINGTON, THE 
MOST UNETHICAL PRESIDENCY: YEAR ONE 11-12 (2018); Sharon LaFraniere et al., 
Trump’s Unparalleled War on a Pillar of Society: Law Enforcement, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/03/us/politics/trump-fbi-justice.html. 
 33 See, e.g., Devlin Barrett & Philip Rucker, Tensions Swell Between Sessions and 
FBI over Senior Personnel from Comey Era, WASH. POST (Jan. 22, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/tensions-between-sessions-
and-fbi-over-senior-personnel-from-comey-era/2018/01/22/c95fc2bc-ffeb-11e7-8acf-
ad2991367d9d_story.html?utm_term=.fbe5acc14b35 (“FBI Director Christopher A. 
Wray has been resisting pressure from Attorney General Jeff Sessions to replace the 
bureau’s deputy director, Andrew McCabe, a frequent target of criticism from 
President Trump.”); Stephen Collinson et al., James Comey Testimony: Trump Asked 
Me to Let Flynn Investigation Go, CNN (June 8, 2017, 1:54 AM ET), 
cnn.com/2017/06/07/politics/james-comey-testimony-released/index.html (reporting 
former FBI Director James Comey’s testimony to Congress that President Trump 
asked Comey for personal loyalty and soon afterwards asked him to drop an FBI 
investigation of Trump campaign advisor and former Trump national security adviser 
Michael Flynn); Ellen Nakashima et al., Trump Asked the Acting FBI Director How He 
Voted During Oval Office Meeting, WASH. POST (Jan. 23, 2018), https://www. 
washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/trump-asked-the-acting-fbi-director-
whom-he-voted-for-during-oval-office-meeting/2018/01/23/2cb50818-0073-11e8-8acf-
ad2991367d9d_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.dae51fbc5762 (reporting that 
soon after Andrew McCabe became acting director of the FBI, Trump called McCabe 
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James Comey in an attempt to stop an investigation of Trump’s 
campaign associates for possible collusion with Russia.34 Trump 
pressured Attorney General Sessions to resign because Sessions 
followed the advice of career ethics officials at the DOJ and recused 
from the Russia-Trump probe, rather than stay in place and use his 
office to protect the President, his family, and associates.35 Sessions 
did in fact resign at the request of President Trump on November 7, 
2018.36 And President Trump also repeatedly pressed the DOJ and the 
FBI to criminally investigate his campaign opponent, Hillary Clinton. 
Trump’s announced view is that federal law enforcement should 
answer directly to him, protect him personally, and advance his 
personal and political agendas.37 
The responses by the 115th Congress to this norm flouting by the 
chief executive were minimal. After firing Comey, apparently for self-
 
to the Oval Office, asked him for whom he had voted in the presidential election, and 
“vented his anger at McCabe” about his wife’s receipt of campaign money from a 
Clinton-connected governor during her 2015 race for a Virginia state legislative seat). 
 34 See, e.g., Matt Apuzzo et al., Trump Told Russians that Firing “Nut Job” Comey Eased 
Pressure from Investigation, N.Y. TIMES (May 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2017/05/19/us/politics/trump-russia-comey.html (reporting that Trump told the Russian 
ambassador in a White House meeting: “I just fired the head of the F.B.I. He was crazy, a 
real nut job . . . . I faced great pressure because of Russia. That’s taken off.”); Devlin Barrett 
& Philip Rucker, Trump Said He Was Thinking of Russia Controversy When He Decided to 
Fire Comey, WASH. POST (May 11, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/ 
national-security/trump-says-fbi-director-comey-told-him-three-times-he-wasnt-under-
investigation-once-in-a-phone-call-initiated-by-the-president/2017/05/11/2b384c9a-3669-
11e7-b4ee-434b6d506b37_story.html?utm_term=.4f5e0a07623b (reporting that President 
Trump said during a televised interview that he was “thinking of” the FBI’s pending 
investigation of connections between the Trump campaign and Russian government 
interference with the presidential election when he fired FBI Director Comey). 
 35 See, e.g., Peter Baker et al., Jeff Sessions is Forced Out as Attorney General as 
Trump Installs Loyalist, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/ 
07/us/politics/sessions-resigns.html [hereinafter Jeff Sessions is Forced Out]. 
 36 Resignation Letter from Jeff Sessions, Att’y Gen., to Donald J. Trump, President 
(Nov. 7, 2018, 4:08 PM ET), https://www.cnn.com/2018/11/07/politics/sessions-
resignation-letter/index.html. 
 37 See, e.g., Michael S. Schmidt & Michael D. Shear, Trump Says Russia Inquiry Makes 
U.S. “Look Very Bad,” N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2017/12/28/us/politics/trump-interview-mueller-russia-china-north-korea.html (Trump 
stated: “I have [the] absolute right to do what I want to do with the Justice Department.”); 
see also Peter Baker, “Very Frustrated” Trump Becomes Top Critic of Law Enforcement, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/03/us/politics/trump-says-justice-
dept-and-fbi-must-do-what-is-right-and-investigate-democrats.html (Trump said, “You 
know, the saddest thing is that because I’m the president of the United States, I am not 
supposed to be involved with the Justice Department.” and “I am not supposed to be 
involved with the F.B.I. I’m not supposed to be doing the kind of things that I would love 
to be doing. And I’m very frustrated by it.”).  
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protective reasons, Trump nominated Christopher Wray, formerly a 
senior DOJ lawyer under George W. Bush, for the FBI directorship. In 
the Senate Judiciary Committee report from the 1970s explaining why 
a ten-year term with no removal restrictions for the FBI Director was 
chosen, the Committee stated that firing a director mid-term would be 
appropriate only due to “a substantial period of time [of] significant 
disagreement and inability to cooperate with the law enforcement 
policies [of] the Executive Branch.”38 It would be improper, the 
Report warned, to fire a director “merely for the reason that a new 
President desires his ‘own man’ in the position” or for partisan or 
political reasons.39 
Yet the Republican-controlled Senate, during Wray’s confirmation 
hearings, did not approach the Wray confirmation hearing “with the 
gravity it deserved” given the circumstances that led to the vacancy at 
the top of the FBI.40 The majority of the Senate appeared “willing to 
tolerate precisely the kind of abusive presidential interference with FBI 
independence that it promised not to tolerate in the aftermath of 
Watergate.”41 
A bill to codify and strengthen the DOJ special counsel regulations42 
under which Robert Mueller is currently investigating Russia’s election 
interference and connections to the Trump campaign, was passed out 
of the Senate Judiciary Committee,43 but has been languishing with 
 
 38 TEN-YEAR TERM FOR THE FBI DIRECTOR, S. REP. NO. 93-1213, at 7 (1974).  
 39 Id. 
 40 Benjamin Wittes, Wray Does Well; the Senate Judiciary Committee Does Not, 
LAWFARE (July 12, 2017, 4:58 PM), www.lawfareblog.com/wray-does-well-senate-
judiciary-committee-does-not. 
 41 Andrew Kent, Congress Should Reconsider Giving the FBI Director Independence 
from Presidential Control, LAWFARE (July 14, 2017, 9:00 AM), 
www.lawfareblog.com/congress-should-reconsider-giving-fbi-director-independence-
presidential-control [hereinafter Congress Should Reconsider]. It is true that before 
Wray’s selection, some senators as well as outside commentators did declare that 
partisan politicians — names floated by the White House included Rep. Trey Gowdy 
(R-S.C.) and Sen. John Cornyn (R-Tex.) — were unacceptable at the head of the FBI. 
See Jack Goldsmith & Benjamin Wittes, Partisan Political Figures Cannot Run the FBI, 
LAWFARE (May 15, 2017, 10:33 AM), www.lawfareblog.com/partisan-political-figures-
cannot-run-fbi (quoting Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.)). And some Senators came to 
the defense of their former colleague, Attorney General Sessions, when President 
Trump insulted him publicly and repeatedly tried to pressure him to resign. See, e.g., 
Austin Wright, Seung Min Kim & Kyle Cheney, Republicans Rush to Sessions’ Defense, 
POLITICO (July 25, 2017, 10:48 AM EDT), www.politico.com/story/2017/07/ 
25/lindsey-graham-jeff-sessions-trump-criticism-240935.  
 42 28 C.F.R. § 600 (2018). 
 43 See Nicholas Fandos, In Warning to Trump, Senators Advance Bill to Protect 
Mueller, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/26/us/politics/ 
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little prospect of a floor vote in the Senate. And little else was done by 
Congress during the first two years of Trump’s presidency to protect 
or promote law enforcement independence and impartiality in the face 
of sustained, unprecedented assaults on these norms by the President. 
As this Article goes to press, control of the House of Representatives 
has shifted to the Democratic party, which will likely lead to 
invigorated oversight. 
The muted and weak response to Trump by the 115th Congress 
contrasts sharply with the Congresses of the 1970s Watergate era. 
Congress then confronted widespread illegality and politicization of 
law enforcement by the White House. It spent much of the decade 
engaging in serious, thoughtful, and sustained oversight and 
regulatory reform, producing enduring legal structures and norms of 
law enforcement independence. The reforms have served the country 
well for two generations. Political scientists spoke of a “resurgence” of 
Congress.44 (Some executive officials complained of a “tethered 
presidency.”45) The lessons and legacy of Congress’s post-Watergate 
reforms have important implications for the present day. 
B. Goals and Theoretical Frameworks 
This Article has three inter-twined aims. First, the Article presents a 
descriptive account of how Congress responded to abuses during the 
1970s, with the goal of showing how Congress helped instantiate 
norms of law enforcement independence and neutrality. Second, 
drawing on congressional proposals from the 1970s, as well as tools 
used by Congress to protect the independence of independent 
regulatory commissions, the Article makes proposals for congressional 
interventions that could respond to President Trump’s words and 
actions. Third, the Article evaluates the constitutionality of these 
suggested options. 
The Article works within three important theoretical frameworks in 
administrative law and political science scholarship. First, agency 
independence from the White House is not a simple or single 
phenomenon: there are a variety of structures and mechanisms 
 
senate-mueller-protection-bill.html. 
 44 See generally JAMES L. SUNDQUIST, THE DECLINE AND RESURGENCE OF CONGRESS 
(1981) (discussing Congress’s resurgence of power in the era following Nixon’s 
presidency). 
 45 See generally THE TETHERED PRESIDENCY: CONGRESSIONAL RESTRAINTS ON 
EXECUTIVE POWER (Thomas M. Franck ed., 1981) (analyzing the historical conflict 
between the legislative and executive branches and the resurgence of congressional 
power). 
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Congress uses to provide some agencies with some kinds of 
independence, and not all agencies commonly understood as 
“independent” have all of these features.46 Kirti Datla and Richard 
Revesz have usefully suggested that agency independence be 
conceived not as polar but as existing on a continuum.47 The legal or 
structural indicia of independence of agencies include: removal 
protection,48 a multimember leadership structure,49 specified terms in 
office, sometimes longer than a President’s,50 partisan balance 
requirements,51 the use of the word “independent” in the agency’s 
authorizing statute,52 and others. While some of these features are 
inapplicable to single person-headed law enforcement agencies like 
DOJ and the FBI, the disaggregation of different independence 
mechanisms is a useful lens through which to understand any agency 
or department. 
Second, Adrian Vermeule has rightly emphasized the powerful role 
that “conventions” — “political norms within relevant legal and 
political communities” whose violation is reasonably expected to 
impose costs on the violator — play in deeming some agencies to be 
 
 46 See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 547 
(2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing different indicia of agency independence); 
MARSHALL J. BREGER & GARY J. EDLES, INDEPENDENT AGENCIES IN THE UNITED STATES: 
LAW, STRUCTURE, AND POLITICS 4-5 (2015); Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: 
Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 26-41 (2010); Kirti 
Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and Executive 
Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 772 (2013).  
 47 Datla & Revesz, supra note 46, at 825-27.  
 48 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 41 (2018) (providing that commissioners heading the 
Federal Trade Commission “may be removed by the President for inefficiency, neglect 
of duty, or malfeasance in office”); 29 U.S.C. § 153 (2018) (“Any member of the 
[National Labor Relations] Board may be removed by the President, upon notice and 
hearing, for neglect of duty or malfeasance in office, but for no other cause.”). These 
provisions contrast with the lack of any statement regarding removal of cabinet 
members such as the Secretary of Defense, Attorney General, Secretary of State, 
Secretary of Commerce, etc.  
 49 See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2018) (providing that the Federal 
Communications Commission is headed by a five-member board of commissioners, 
one of whom is designed by the President as the chair).  
 50 E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (2018) (granting the commissioners of the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) five-year terms). 
 51 E.g., 52 U.S.C. § 30106(a)(1), (5) (2018) (providing that, of the six voting 
members who head the Federal Election Commission, “[n]o more than 3 members . . . 
may be affiliated with the same political party,” and the chairman and vice chairman 
“shall not be affiliated with the same political party”).  
 52 E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2053(a) (2018) (“An independent regulatory commission is 
hereby established, to be known as the Consumer Product Safety Commission.”). 
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more independent than others, irrespective of underlying statutory 
indicia of independence.53 And as Vermeule, Daphna Renan, and 
others have observed, the independence of federal law enforcement 
from the White House, such as it is, has been largely a matter of 
conventions or norms rather than law.54 For my purposes, I will use 
“norms” and “conventions” as interchangeable terms. Similar to 
Vermeule’s definition of conventions, Renan, for example, defines 
structural political norms as “unwritten or informal rules,” “informed 
by but not clearly characterized as the legal,” that “govern political 
behavior” because they are expected to be followed by important 
societal groups (sociological legitimacy) and thought by those groups 
to be normatively attractive or even compulsory.55 Recognizing the 
role of conventions or norms means that responses to President 
Trump’s threats to independence could take the form of legislation, or 
could be less formal actions that signal displeasure and reproach by 
Congress or the public and otherwise seek to buttress valuable 
norms.56 
Third, congressional oversight works, in that it often affects how the 
executive branch carries out its responsibilities and functions,57 and 
plays a critical role in defining and enforcing conventions or norms of 
agency independence.58 Therefore, it is well worth thinking about how 
Congress can use the many levers it has to promote better practices in 
 
 53 Adrian Vermeule, Conventions of Agency Independence, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1163, 
1165-66 (2013) [hereinafter Conventions]; see also Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. 
Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 547 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting 
that the independence of SEC Commissioners is maintained in part by “a political 
environment, reflecting tradition and function, that would impose a heavy political 
cost upon any President who tried to remove a commissioner of the agency without 
cause”). 
 54 See, e.g., Renan, supra note 25, at 2207-14 (arguing that a structural norm 
insulates certain types of law enforcement investigative decision-making from 
presidential control); Vermeule, Conventions, supra note 53, at 1201-03 (exploring 
how President George W. Bush and Attorney General Alberto Gonzales were 
politically penalized for violating a convention that U.S. Attorneys not to be replaced 
mid-term, even though statutory law and case law allowed at-will removal).  
 55 Renan, supra note 25, at 2196. 
 56 See, e.g., Vermeule, Conventions, supra note 53, at 1182 (discussing sanctions 
for breach of conventions). 
 57 See generally LOUIS FISHER, THE POLITICS OF SHARED POWER: CONGRESS AND THE 
EXECUTIVE 68-176 (4th ed. 1998) (reviewing formal and informal techniques by which 
Congress and individual committees and members influence the executive branch’s 
administration of the laws); Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 61 (2006) (reviewing how Congress oversees administration of the law 
“both formally and informally”). 
 58 See BREGER & EDLES, supra note 46, at 4-5. 
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federal law enforcement. And it is useful now, when norms of law 
enforcement independence are being challenged by President Trump, 
to understand the enormously important role Congress played in the 
1970s in shaping those norms. 
The remainder of this Article is in four parts. Part I sets the stage for 
what follows. It briefly outlines the abusive practices of federal 
enforcement agencies, and the politicization of those agencies by the 
White House, that came to a head in the Watergate scandal. This Part 
then highlights congressional oversight and reform efforts in the 
1970s. It closes with a description of the powers and responsibilities of 
the Attorney General and FBI Director today, after the lawmaking and 
norm-creating of the 1970s. Part II draws on reform proposals from 
the 1970s, among other sources, to suggest nine constitutionally 
uncontroversial ways that Congress could act to buttress federal law 
enforcement independence, neutrality, and professionalism. Part III 
addresses two constitutionally controversial, more aggressive 
possibilities: statutory restrictions on whom the President could 
appoint to head the DOJ and FBI and on the President’s ability to 
remove those officials. A conclusion offers a menu of specific 
proposals that might be useful in the present environment. 
I. BACKGROUND: POWERS, ABUSES, AND CONGRESSIONAL REFORM 
This Part first briefly outlines abusive conduct by the DOJ, FBI, and 
Nixon White House that prompted widespread calls for reform in the 
1970s. It then describes the highlights of the efforts by Congress to 
reform federal law enforcement in the 1970s, helping to create the 
norms of independence, nonpartisanship, and professionalism 
described above. This Part closes with a summary of the powers and 
responsibilities of the Attorney General and FBI Director today, to set 
the stage for the discussions of reforms in Parts III and IV. 
A. A Sketch of Abuses by DOJ, the FBI, and the Nixon White House 
J. Edgar Hoover’s reign at the top of the FBI lasted from the creation 
of the Bureau’s predecessor organization in 1924 until his death in 
197259 — from President Coolidge to President Nixon. Under Hoover, 
the Bureau’s many sins60 included programs to monitor, harass, 
 
 59 See, e.g., CURT GENTRY, J. EDGAR HOOVER: THE MAN AND THE SECRETS 32, 34 
(1991). 
 60 The following paragraph recounts information found in many sources which 
have exhaustively examined the abuses of Hoover-led FBI. See, e.g., SELECT COMM. TO 
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, BOOK III: 
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disrupt, and discredit — with real and fabricated salacious information 
— supposedly subversive American political, religious, and social 
groups and individuals, including the Black Panther Party, the 
Southern Christian Leadership Conference (led by Martin Luther 
King, Jr.), anti-Vietnam War student groups, Earth Day environmental 
activities, Muhammad Ali, John Lennon, Malcolm X, and many others. 
The FBI surveilled, often illegally, and kept dossiers on thousands of 
other Americans, including writers and entertainers suspected of 
communist or radical views (e.g., Langston Hughes, Dorothy Parker, 
Charlie Chaplin, Arthur Miller). The abuses of McCarthyism were 
greatly furthered by Hoover and the FBI’s penchant for exaggerating 
the communist threat. Several Presidents — Truman, Kennedy, and 
Nixon — are known to have considered firing Hoover, but feared to 
do so because of his political connections, popular support, and 
willingness to credibly threaten blackmail. 
As it grew greatly in size and power over the course of Hoover’s 
directorship, the FBI operated largely free from legal constraint.61 The 
organization lacked even a statutory charter.62 The Bureau was very 
lightly overseen by both the Justice Department leadership and 
Congress until the death of Hoover in the early 1970s.63 
Hoover allowed the FBI to be used by President Lyndon Johnson as 
a political intelligence service, for instance, by reporting on activities 
by civil rights groups and liberal Democrats at the 1964 Democratic 
Convention, and investigating and reporting on the backgrounds and 
 
SUPPLEMENTARY DETAILED STAFF REPORTS ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF 
AMERICANS, S. REP. NO. 94-755, at 4 (1976); DAVID GARROW, THE FBI AND MARTIN 
LUTHER KING, JR. 12 (2006); ATHAN G. THEOHARIS & JOHN STUART COX, THE BOSS: J. 
EDGAR HOOVER AND THE GREAT AMERICAN INQUISITION 3-15 (1988); ATHAN G. 
THEOHARIS, SPYING ON AMERICANS: POLITICAL SURVEILLANCE FROM HOOVER TO THE 
HUSTON PLAN (1978) (describing various FBI domestic surveillance program); TIM 
WEINER, ENEMIES: A HISTORY OF THE FBI (2012) (providing examples of FBI 
investigations under Hoover into various public figures and political groups).  
 61 FBI Statutory Charter: Hearings Before the S. Comm. of the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 
4 (1978) (statement of Hon. Griffin B. Bell, Att’y Gen.) (“Despite its long history, the 
Bureau has received very little statutory guidance. There are, basically, only three 
provisions defining its duties: [28 U.S.C. §§ 533-534 and 42 U.S.C. § 3744].”). 
 62 See id. 
 63 See, e.g., id. at 2 (statement of Sen. Edward Kennedy) (“Congress and the 
executive branch must share responsibility with the Bureau for the fact that the FBI 
has never before been truly accountable to anyone for anything. The Bureau, for 
decades, operated with independence from any day-to-day accountability within the 
Justice Department or the executive branch. Congress only recently has exercised its 
own responsibility to question the overall directions, the underlying policies, and the 
basic program decisions of the Bureau.”).  
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contacts of anti-Vietnam War groups and individuals.64 The pattern 
continued under Nixon. The Nixon White House used the FBI to 
investigate those they considered political opponents, which included 
wiretapping sitting members of Congress and journalists.65 In 
addition, Nixon had the FBI tap the telephones of members of the 
National Security Council and journalists who he thought were 
involved in leaks related to the war in Vietnam.66 
For Attorney General, Nixon in 1969 had chosen John Mitchell, the 
new President’s friend, former law partner, and manager of his 
presidential campaign.67 Mitchell served as a close political adviser to 
Nixon during the first term, and began working on the re-election 
campaign well before he stepped down from the Attorney General’s 
job in March 1972 to formally take charge of the Committee to Re-
Elect the President (soon dubbed “CREEP” by Nixon critics).68 As 
head of the re-election campaign, Mitchell approved plans for illegal 
bugging of the Democratic National Committee (“DNC”) headquarters 
and other campaign dirty tricks, suggested by White House and 
campaign aides.69 Mitchell was succeeded as Attorney General by 
Richard Kleindienst, who came from a thoroughly political 
 
 64 See ATHAN G. THEOHARIS, THE FBI AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: A BRIEF CRITICAL 
HISTORY 126-27 (2004) [hereinafter CRITICAL HISTORY]. 
 65 See id. at 128; see also STANLEY I. KUTLER, THE WARS OF WATERGATE: THE LAST 
CRISIS OF RICHARD NIXON 180, 233, 367 (1990). 
 66 See ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 256-57 (1973). At 
that time, the legality of “national security”-related wiretaps was unclear. Congress in 
1968 had regulated wiretapping for criminal investigations, imposing strict judicial 
oversight, but a proviso in the law disclaimed an intent to outlaw national security 
wiretapping pursuant to the President’s constitutional authorities. See Omnibus Crime 
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit. III, 82 Stat. 197, 211-14. 
The so-called “national security” proviso was found at 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3). It was not 
until near the end of Nixon’s first term — after a lot of non-statutory wiretapping 
supposedly for national security purposes had already occurred — that the Supreme 
Court made clear that wiretapping of “domestic” threats to national security must 
proceed with judicial pre-approval, whether under the 1968 statute or a new one. See 
United States v. U.S. Dist. Court for E. Dist. of Mich., 407 U.S. 297, 313-21 (1972). 
The Court left open the question of the nature of the President’s constitutional 
powers, and the Fourth Amendment restrictions on, purely executive wiretapping 
aimed at “foreign” security threats. See id. at 309, 321-22. Wiretaps of domestic 
individuals and organizations done for political purposes and installed by the 
executive without judicial approval were quite obviously illegal. 
 67 NANCY V. BAKER, CONFLICTING LOYALTIES: LAW AND POLITICS IN THE ATTORNEY 
GENERAL’S OFFICE, 1789–1990, at 120-21 (1992) [hereinafter CONFLICTING LOYALTIES]. 
 68 Id. at 121-23.  
 69 See id. at 122-25. 
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background in Arizona.70 While in office, Kleindienst frequently 
seemed to mix campaign activities, including fundraising, with 
prosecutorial decisions.71 
Somewhat ironically, given his decades of illegal and abusive 
harassment and surveillance of suspected subversives, Hoover refused 
to allow the FBI to participate in a radical, wide-ranging plan by Nixon 
staffers to use the FBI and the Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”) for 
a broad campaign of illegal surveillance, breaking and entering, and 
undercover infiltration aimed at student groups, journalists, and other 
perceived opponents of the regime. Hoover’s refusal led Nixon to 
create an in-house operation, dubbed the White House “plumbers.”72 
It was some of these plumbers who later carried out the Watergate 
burglary. 
After Hoover died in office, in May 1972 President Nixon appointed 
a DOJ official, L. Patrick Gray, to be acting director of the FBI. Nixon 
believed that Gray would be pliable and loyal. The President had 
known Gray since 1947, and Gray worked on Nixon’s 1960 
presidential campaign.73 Soon after his acting appointment as head of 
the FBI, Gray gave a campaign speech for the President in the 
battleground state of Ohio.74 
In the early morning of June 17, 1972, five men were caught 
breaking into the DNC headquarters in the Watergate building in 
Washington DC, carrying burglary tools and surveillance equipment. 
Two were former FBI agents — Gordon Liddy and James McCord — 
now working for Nixon’s re-election campaign. When an FBI 
supervisor learned about the burglary, the Bureau opened an 
investigation under the federal criminal statute banning unauthorized 
wiretapping. A senior White House aide, John Ehrlichman, called the 
FBI and stated: “I have a mandate from the President of the United 
 
 70 Removing Politics Hearing, supra note 23, at 70 (statement of Hon. Richard G. 
Kleindienst, former Att’y Gen.) (noting that Kleindienst had chaired the Arizona 
Republican State Committee, served in the Arizona legislature, run for governor, was 
National Director of Field Operations for Nixon’s 1968 presidential campaign, and 
had served as general counsel of the Republican National Committee). 
 71 See, e.g., RICHARD BEN-VENISTE, THE EMPEROR’S NEW CLOTHES: EXPOSING THE 
TRUTH FROM WATERGATE TO 9/11, at 35 (2011) (recounting an instance in which 
Kleindienst seemed willfully blind to the appearance of campaign funds being used as 
a bribe). 
 72 SCHLESINGER, supra note 66, at 260-61; see THEOHARIS, CRITICAL HISTORY, supra 
note 64, at 128-30. 
 73 KUTLER, supra note 65, at 266. 
 74 Id. at 267.  
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States . . . . The FBI is to terminate the investigation of the break-in.”75 
After the supervisor who took the call refused, Ehrlichman threatened 
that his career was “doomed.”76 
Nixon then sent a top CIA official, a longtime friend, to falsely warn 
the FBI that national security would be compromised if it did not drop 
the investigation.77 Gray initially acceded to the request, but was 
convinced by his top deputies that the FBI must continue to 
investigate the matter, and do it as impartially as possible. “The FBI is 
not under control, because Gray doesn’t exactly know how to control 
them,” White House chief of staff H.R. Haldeman lamented to Nixon.78 
Attorney General Kleindienst ordered Gray to keep the White 
House, via White House counsel John Dean, fully briefed on the FBI 
investigation of the Watergate burglary and related events.79 
Kleindienst also promised White House staff that he personally would 
keep them informed.80 Henry Petersen, the Assistant Attorney General 
for the Criminal Division, tried to keep the Watergate investigation 
narrow, and frequently reported on its progress to Dean.81 At the 
request of Dean, Petersen tried to discourage a congressional 
committee from investigating.82 Contrary to all protocol, Gray let 
Dean sit in on FBI interviews of witnesses and suspects, and gave raw 
FBI investigative materials to Dean.83 Dean bragged to Nixon during 
the cover-up, “I was totally aware of what the Bureau was doing at all 
times. I was totally aware of what the Grand Jury was doing.”84 Dean 
used information from Gray and Petersen to coach witnesses to lie to 
the grand jury.85 Even as the investigation had reached very close to 
the Oval Office, Petersen and Kleindienst repeatedly briefed Nixon 
about proceedings before the grand jury and likely indictments.86 
 
 75 WEINER, supra note 60, at 309. 
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 80 OLSON, supra note 79, at 48. 
 81 Id. at 49, 56. 
 82 Id. at 66. 
 83 Id. at 72.  
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 85 Id. at 57. 
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Mitchell actively participated in the Watergate cover-up, conspiring 
with Dean and other White House staffers to destroy documents held 
by CREEP and the White House.87 Mitchell also publicly lied about 
the break-in.88 
At his confirmation hearings, after being nominated by Nixon for 
the FBI Directorship, Acting Director Gray admitted to the access into 
the FBI investigation he had given to Dean.89 During the proceedings, 
it also emerged that Gray had concealed and destroyed evidence of 
wrongdoing from a White House safe belonging to one of Nixon’s 
dirty tricks operatives.90 
Gray resigned, and his nomination to be the confirmed FBI Director 
was withdrawn. Mitchell eventually admitted that he had been 
involved in planning the bugging and dirty tricks operations.91 He was 
convicted by a jury of five counts related to Watergate perjury and 
obstruction of justice.92 Kleindienst had to resign because of his close 
professional and personal relationships with many people being 
investigated, and press and congressional suspicion that he was 
involved in the cover-up.93 It soon emerged that in 1971, while Deputy 
Attorney General, Kleindienst had complied with a request from 
Nixon to favorably settle an antitrust suit against ITT, a large U.S.-
based conglomerate; ITT was a big campaign donor to the Republican 
National Convention. Kleindienst had denied having done this during 
his confirmation hearings, and subsequently pled guilty to contempt 
of Congress for having given false testimony.94 A third Nixon Attorney 
General, Elliott Richardson, resigned in October 1973, only a few 
months after succeeding Kleindienst, after refusing Nixon’s direction 
to fire special counsel Archibald Cox who was investigating 
Watergate.95 
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B. Congress’s Burst of Reformist Zeal 
The size and scope of activities of the executive branch grew 
enormously during the mid-twentieth century, during the presidencies 
of Franklin D. Roosevelt through Lyndon Johnson. This growth in 
resources at the president’s disposal, combined with the centralizing 
pressures of the World War II and the Cold War, led to an enormous 
“concentration of authority in the Presidency.”96 In 1973, historian 
Arthur Schlesinger famously described an “imperial Presidency.”97 
By the early 1970s, Congress had started pushing back. 
Disillusionment with the war in Indochina and revulsion at the 
criminality of the Nixon administration fueled a drive by Congress to 
investigate and reform the executive branch. Congress used all of its 
tools — prominently the investigative and oversight powers, its 
authority to legislate, and the Senate’s gate-keeper role with 
nominations for senior executive officials — to push a comprehensive 
reform agenda. 
Congressional committee hearings unearthed and publicized 
scandalous executive branch behavior. The Senate Watergate 
Committee (officially the Select Committee on Presidential Campaign 
Activities98), chaired by Senator Sam Ervin of North Carolina, a 
conservative Democrat, aggressively investigated the Nixon’s 
administration’s cover-ups, lies, and abuse of FBI and DOJ processes.99 
The House Judiciary Committee adopted impeachment resolutions 
against Nixon that prominently featured charges of political abuse of, 
and interference with, DOJ and FBI investigative functions.100 Nixon 
resigned soon thereafter.101 Congress also delved into FBI abuses of 
Hoover’s tenure, most famously during the Church Committee 
hearings in 1975, that also addressed misuse of the CIA and military to 
spy on Americans.102 The Senate insisted during confirmation hearings 
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on nominees for top DOJ and FBI posts that they pledge to be 
independent and nonpartisan.103 And numerous hearings were held on 
ways to protect and bolster the independence, integrity, and apolitical 
nature of federal law enforcement, as well as the civil liberties of 
Americans who might be investigated.104 
Some important statutory reforms directly responded to abuses of 
the Hoover and Nixon eras — the secret wiretaps for thin or 
pretextual “national security” reasons, the compilation and 
distribution of derogatory dossiers on the American citizens, and the 
inability of citizens to know what the government was saying about 
them. To respond to this, Congress: 
• protected Americans against misuse of their personal 
information by the government through the Privacy Act105 and 
the Right to Financial Privacy Act;106 
• imposed judicial review and privacy protections on the 
executive’s surveillance aimed for foreign intelligence 
purposes, when conducted in the United States or targeted at 
U.S. persons abroad;107 and 
• strengthened the Freedom of Information Act.108 
An energized Congress ranged well beyond law enforcement reform, 
into a broad array of areas where it perceived executive overreach or 
abuse. In retrospect, we can see that the 1970s were watershed years 
for the executive branch and the rule of law, as Congress, over a 
number of years, enacted a large number of important statutes to 
address past executive abuses and prevent future ones. Among other 
things, Congress in the 1970s: 
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• created an independent counsel mechanism to investigate 
wrongdoing in the upper reaches of the executive branch;109 
• imposed financial disclosure obligations on members of 
Congress and their staffs, executive branch officials, including 
the President, and federal judges;110 
• installed largely independent inspectors general in executive 
agencies to monitor for fraud and abuse and report to 
Congress;111 
• created permanent select committees in both houses of 
Congress to oversee the intelligence community;112 
• required a specific presidential finding and the briefing of 
Congress for CIA covert actions;113 
• imposed strict limitations on the distribution and use of tax 
returns to law enforcement and other government entities;114 
• reformed the civil service to protect and promote 
professionalism;115 
• strengthened campaign finance laws;116 
 
 109 Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, tit. VI, § 601, 92 Stat. 
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• repealed the Emergency Detention Act, which had been used 
by the FBI to investigate allegedly subversive individuals and 
organizations, in preparation for their non-criminal detention 
during a national security crisis;117 and 
• attempted to regulate unilateral presidential war-making in the 
War Powers Resolution.118 
Amid this period of dramatic reform and restructuring of the 
executive branch, Congress debated fundamental changes to the 
structure of the DOJ and FBI. For instance, leading senators proposed 
shielding both the Attorney General and FBI Director from 
presidential control with a good-cause removal requirement.119 But 
ultimately there was little structural reform of federal law enforcement 
by Congress. Congress rejected any attempts to define binding 
qualifications for the appointment of the FBI Director;120 rejected a 
legislative charter for the Bureau that would have included statutory 
protections for independence and civil liberties;121 rejected proposals 
to move the FBI out from under the supervision and control of the 
Attorney General; declined to take selection of U.S. Attorneys away 
from the President; and rejected bills proposing that the FBI Director 
and Attorney General could be fired only for good cause. The one 
structural reform adopted was a 1976 law giving the FBI Director a 
non-renewable ten-year term in office, but with no restriction on 
removal.122 
Some legislative reforms were headed off by self-regulatory 
initiatives of the executive branch. For instance, Attorney General 
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Edward Levi in 1976 adopted guidelines for FBI domestic intelligence 
agencies that sought to prevent any repeat of the abuses of the Hoover 
era.123 Attorney General Griffin Bell in 1978 adopted rules that 
dramatically restricted White House contacts with the DOJ and FBI.124 
Presidents Carter and Ford, seeking to clean off the stains of the 
Nixon years, appointed senior law enforcement officials who were 
committed to independence, integrity, and nonpartisanship. 
But coming out of the 1970s, nothing in binding law sought to 
mandate that the heads of the DOJ or FBI possess and abide by these 
ideals. Norms, not law, were left to do this work.125 
C. Powers of the Attorney General and FBI Director Today 
To set the stage for the legal analysis that follows, it is important to 
understand the allocation and extent of legal powers over law 
enforcement as they exist today, after the reforms of previous decades. 
The Attorney General, appointed by the President with the Senate’s 
advice and consent,126 heads the DOJ and is authorized to exercise all 
authorities delegated to the DOJ or any of its components by 
Congress, and to subdelegate to his or her subordinates.127 DOJ 
components supervised by the Attorney General include the FBI; Drug 
Enforcement Administration; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms 
and Explosives; Bureau of Prisons; Office of Justice Programs; and the 
U.S. Attorneys and U.S. Marshals Service.128 Except as authorized by 
statute, all litigation for the United States government, “and securing 
evidence therefor, is reserved to officers of the Department of Justice, 
under the direction of the Attorney General.”129 Among other things, 
the Attorney General oversees the enforcement in court of all federal 
criminal laws and, unless specifically provided otherwise by statute, 
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civil statutes as well. By executive order, the Attorney General 
provides oversight of the domestic intelligence gathering of federal 
agencies.130 Other functions of the Attorney General include 
“[f]urnish[ing] advice and opinions, formal and informal, on legal 
matters to the President and the Cabinet and to the heads of the 
executive departments and agencies of the government,” “[m]ak[ing] 
recommendations to the President concerning appointments to federal 
judicial positions and to positions within the Department, including 
U.S. Attorneys and U.S. Marshals,” and “[r]epresent[ing] or 
supervis[ing] the representation of the United States Government in 
the Supreme Court of the United States and all other courts, foreign 
and domestic, in which the United States is a party or has an interest 
as may be deemed appropriate.”131 
Primary responsibility for “prosecut[ing] . . . all offenses against the 
United States” is given by statute to U.S. Attorneys, within their 
respective districts.132 These U.S. Attorneys are appointed by the 
President with the advice and consent of the Senate, for a four-year 
term,133 housed within the DOJ, hierarchically under the Attorney 
General,134 and are expressly subject to removal by the President.135 
Since 1968, the FBI Director has been appointed by the President 
with the advice and consent of the Senate.136 The FBI, headed by the 
director, is the primary federal law enforcement agency and the lead 
domestic intelligence agency. Exercising delegated authority from the 
Attorney General, the FBI Director “shall . . . [i]nvestigate violations of 
the laws . . . of the United States and collect evidence in cases in which 
the United States” is involved or interested, unless such responsibility 
to exclusively assigned to another agency.137 The FBI is the lead 
agency to investigate a wide variety of federal crimes, including those 
in highly salient and sensitive areas such as terrorism, espionage and 
foreign counterintelligence, foreign sabotage, arms and technology 
smuggling, domestic political and political campaign corruption, 
mishandling or leaking of protected government information, and 
intentional interference with voting rights and civil rights. 
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The FBI is also the lead domestic intelligence agency. As such it 
exercises powers delegated by both the President and Congress to 
investigate discrete intelligence matters and engages in “broader 
analytic and planning functions.”138 To protect the liberties of 
Americans, the CIA — an entity not schooled in due process — is 
barred from exercising any “police, subpoena, law enforcement 
powers or internal security functions.”139 No intelligence community 
entity except the FBI is allowed to engage within the United States in 
“foreign intelligence collection . . . for the purpose of acquiring 
information concerning the domestic activities of United States 
persons.”140 The FBI’s other major functions are to provide 
investigative assistance to other federal law enforcement agencies, as 
well as state, local, tribal, and foreign entities; and to retain, analyze, 
and share law enforcement relevant information,141 such as biomarkers 
like fingerprints. 
DOJ regulations require the FBI Director to “report to the Attorney 
General on all . . . activities” of the FBI.142 In its intelligence 
community capacity, the FBI is also placed under the “supervision” of 
the Attorney General and subject to the coordinating, information 
collecting, and tasking authorities of the Director of National 
Intelligence.143 
FBI special agents have delegated authority, subject to the direction 
and control of the director, to investigate violations of criminal and 
civil laws of the United States; gather evidence for court cases; make 
arrests; serve and execute arrest warrants; serve judicial subpoenas; 
execute warrants to seize property; serve administrative subpoenas in 
certain circumstances (investigations of drug programs, health care 
fraud, and child exploitation); serve National Security Letters (similar 
to administrative subpoenas) to obtain banking, credit, consumer and 
related records; and carry firearms.144 Guidelines issued by the 
Attorney General govern the opening of FBI investigations and then 
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investigative steps that may be used.145 As greater investigative powers 
are granted, higher level supervisory approval and more stringent 
factual and legal predicates are required. Attorney General guidelines 
and an executive order require that all investigations and intelligence 
gathering by the FBI must occur by the “least intrusive” means or 
method possible, based on the circumstances.146 
The involvement of DOJ prosecutors and often, the judiciary, is 
legally required for the most intrusive measures. FBI agents can seek 
to obtain information through federal grand jury subpoenas only by 
requesting a U.S. Attorney’s Office to do so.147 By statute and executive 
branch rules, wiretaps can be sought by the FBI only with concurrence 
of DOJ attorneys, and applications must be granted by a judicial 
officer. No criminal prosecution may be initiated by the FBI acting 
alone; only DOJ attorneys are authorized to take this step.148 
II. A MENU OF OPTIONS FOR CONGRESS, PART ONE: THE LESS 
CONSTITUTIONALLY CONTROVERSIAL 
This Part presents a number of options for a Congress which desires to 
bolster the fraying norms of law enforcement independence and 
impartiality. More constitutionally doubtful options are saved for Part IV. 
A. The Advice and Consent Function 
All principal officers of the United States — in the executive branch, 
think heads of departments and agencies — must be nominated and 
appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the 
Senate.149 This is also the default mode of appointment for so-called 
inferior officers — persons exercising significant power pursuant to 
the laws of the United States but under the supervision of a principal 
officer.150 The most important offices in federal law enforcement all 
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require Senate advice and consent, giving the Senate a very important 
role to play in preserving law enforcement independence. These 
offices — for example, Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General, 
U.S. Attorney, FBI Director — wield enormous powers, for good or ill, 
making essential Senatorial attention to the character, integrity, and 
experience of nominees. 
Since Hoover’s death, every confirmation hearing for a permanent 
FBI Director has featured Senators and the nominee insisting that the 
FBI remain an independent, professional, nonpartisan agency.151 
Frequently, nominees have stated that they sought and received 
assurances from the President and Attorney General, before agreeing 
to take the job, that they would have substantial independence.152 In 
advance of hearings, senators might tell nominees that they will seek a 
public record of such assurances, thereby incentivizing nominees to 
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have conversations about independence with the President and 
Attorney General. Even without such conversations, a public pledge, 
under oath, of a commitment to independence is useful. It pre-
commits the nominee, and provides a focal point for later oversight 
hearings if the commitment does not appear to have been honored. 
To ensure that nominees have bipartisan support, the Senate might 
consider bringing back the filibuster for confirmation of officials like 
the Attorney General, FBI Director, or U.S. Attorneys. Academics have 
debated the constitutionality of filibuster,153 but there is essentially no 
way for a legal challenge to be made justiciable, meaning that the 
Senate will have a free hand to act by internal rule. 
B. Congressional Hearings 
Congress has very wide powers to conduct oversight of the 
executive branch,154 and essentially unlimited power to holding 
hearings to publicly air the opinions of members of Congress or third 
parties. “Agency officials can be noticeably influenced by the 
knowledge and expectation that they will be called before a 
congressional committee regularly to account for the activities of their 
agencies.”155 There is much that Congress, via one or more of its 
committees, could do to bolster law enforcement independence 
though hearings that would be entirely uncontroversial from a 
constitutional perspective. Two obvious possibilities are: (1) hearings 
on the importance of law enforcement independence and non-
partisanship, featuring respected former government officials, 
academics, and other authorities, and (2) oversight hearings at which 
officials like the Attorney General and the FBI Director are questioned 
closely about any instances of White House interference, and asked to 
 
 153 See, e.g., Josh Chafetz, The Unconstitutionality of the Filibuster, 43 CONN. L. REV. 
1003 (2011); Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Filibuster, 49 STAN. L. REV. 
181 (1997); Michael J. Gerhardt, The Constitutionality of the Filibuster, 21 CONST. 
COMMENT. 445 (2004); Tonja Jacobi & Jeff VanDam, The Filibuster and Reconciliation: 
The Future of Majoritarian Lawmaking in the U.S. Senate, 47 UC DAVIS L. REV. 261, 317-
20 (2013). 
 154 See generally Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 111-12 (1959) 
(discussing the use and extent of Congress’s ability to conduct oversight of the other 
branches of the federal government); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 160-74 
(1927) (discussing the limits of Congress’s investigative powers); Andrew McCanse 
Wright, Constitutional Conflict and Congressional Oversight, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 881, 893-
98 (2014) (outlining the extent to which the Constitution permits congressional 
oversight of the Executive Branch). 
 155 ALISSA M. DOLAN ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT 
MANUAL 72 (2014), http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL30240.pdf [hereinafter CRS MANUAL]. 
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publicly articulate the importance of norms of independence. 
Congress’s aggressive use of oversight hearings in the 1970s was a 
useful tool for inculcating norms of law enforcement independence.156 
C. Censure 
Congress has the power to pass resolutions of censure against 
executive officials, including the President. These simple or 
concurrent resolutions do not have binding legal effect,157 but do 
“express a particular moral judgment and may have both symbolic as 
well as political implications.”158 At least four times, a chamber of the 
Congress has adopted a censure resolution directed at a President.159 
And many more have been introduced but not acted on. 
These formally non-binding resolutions — which are not subject to 
disapproval by the President — are often not worth the paper they are 
written on. But in some contexts, a statement of policy or principle — 
especially if enacted by both houses, and/or on a bipartisan basis — 
can have important political and communicative effects. As Jacob 
Gersen and Eric Posner have argued, these kinds of “soft statutes” can 
have two primary effects. “First, Congress . . . uses soft law to convey 
information about future intentions to enact hard law, allowing people 
to adjust their behavior in advance of binding statutes and in some 
cases avoiding constitutional requirements that apply to hard law.”160 
And “[s]econd, Congress uses soft law to convey information about its 
beliefs about the state of the world — both factual and normative.”161 
 
 156 See, e.g., Removing Politics Hearing, supra note 23, at 23 (collecting press 
coverage of congressional hearings on the need for law enforcement independence). 
 157 See JANE A. HUDIBURG & CHRISTOPHER M. DAVIS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
RESOLUTIONS TO CENSURE THE PRESIDENT: PROCEDURE AND HISTORY 1 (2018), 
http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45087.pdf. Simple resolutions are passed by a majority of 
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the policy or “sense” of Congress. See JACK MASKELL & RICHARD S. BETH, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., CONGRESSIONAL CENSURE AND “NO CONFIDENCE” VOTES REGARDING 
PUBLIC OFFICIALS 2 (2016), http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45087.pdf. 
 158 MASKELL & BETH, supra note 157, at Summary.  
 159 Jane A. Hudiburg, Resolutions Censuring the President: History and Context, 1st-
114th Congresses, CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE (Sept. 14, 2017), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/ 
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61 STAN. L. REV. 573, 586 (2008). 
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Congress or either house of it could use this power to publicize their 
disagreement with actions by Presidents which undermine norms of 
law enforcement independence and neutrality. 
D. Impeachment 
By a majority vote, the House of Representatives may impeach the 
President or other executive or judicial officers of the United States; If 
two-thirds of the Senate convicts, the official is removed from office.162 
In July 1974, the Judiciary Committee of the House, by a bipartisan 
vote, approved three articles of impeachment against President Nixon. 
Because of the seeming inevitability of impeachment by the House and 
removal by the Senate, Nixon resigned a few weeks later. 
Two of the articles enunciated important principles about the 
independence of federal law enforcement from the White House. 
Article I charged Nixon with violation of his oath and obstruction of 
justice by, among other things, lying and causing others to lie to 
federal criminal investigators, withholding material evidence, and 
“interfering or endeavouring to interfere with the conduct of 
investigations by the Department of Justice of the United States, the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, [and] the office of Watergate Special 
Prosecution Force . . . .”163 The Judiciary Committee thus announced, 
after lengthy debate and extensive hearings, that a President violates a 
core responsibility of the office if he or she seeks to mislead, obstruct, 
or defeat a criminal investigation for self-interested or self-protective 
reasons.164 Article II charged Nixon with violating his oath, failure to 
faithfully execute the laws, and impairing “the due and proper 
administration of justice” by, among other wrongful acts, “knowingly 
misus[ing] the executive power by interfering with agencies of the 
executive branch, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the 
Criminal Division, and the Office of Watergate Special Prosecution 
Force, of the Department of Justice,” and by directing federal law 
enforcement agencies to spy on and gather information about 
American citizens for purposes other than bona fide national security 
or criminal investigative reasons.165 In this article, the Judiciary 
Committee announced the important principle that federal executive 
agencies must have good faith and public interest reasons to gather 
 
 162 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5; id. art. I, § 3, cl. 7; id. art. II, § 4. 
 163 IMPEACHMENT OF RICHARD M. NIXON PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. REP. 
NO. 93-1305, at 2 (1974). 
 164 See id. at 1-2. 
 165 Id. at 3-4.  
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information on Americans, and cannot be used as political or personal 
spies for the President. 
Without going into too much detail, I think it is fair to say that 
President Trump’s time in office will prove fertile ground if the House 
of Representatives investigates whether impeachment may be 
warranted. Special focus on his interference with and attempts to 
misuse federal law enforcement institutions would be appropriate. 
E. Government Accountability Office Investigations 
The Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) (formerly the 
General Accounting Office) is a congressional agency tasked with 
auditing, investigating, and reporting on the executive branch.166 GAO 
can be tasked to perform investigations or other oversight activities by 
congressional committees or subcommittees or public laws.167 
In addition to broad authorization to audit the spending of money, 
GAO has statutory authority to “evaluate the results of a program or 
activity the Government carries out under existing law. . . .”168 The 
executive branch has taken the position that the reference to “under 
existing law” only covers executive activities to carry out statutory 
programs, not executive activities authorized solely by the President’s 
constitutional powers.169 Since criminal law enforcement functions of 
the DOJ and FBI involve at their core the carrying out of a statutory 
program — embodied in the statutes criminalizing certain conduct 
and tasking specific executive agencies with investigating and 
prosecuting violations — GAO would seem to have sufficient statutory 
authority to carry out broad-ranging investigations of the 
 
 166 GAO’s Mission, Responsibilities, Strategies, and Means: Mission Statement, U.S. 
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., http://www.gao.gov/dsp/3mission.html (last visited Feb. 
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to the Congress under the Constitution and the federal government’s accountability to 
the American people.”); see 31 U.S.C. § 702(a) (2018) (“The Government 
Accountability Office is an instrumentality of the United States Government 
independent of the executive departments.”).  
 167 See 31 U.S.C. § 717(d)(1); About GAO, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., 
http://www.gao.gov/about/index.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2019); The Report Process, 
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politicization of law enforcement. So a Congress or congressional 
committee or subcommittee interested in investigating — and hence 
disincentivizing — partisan law enforcement and improper White 
House interference could set GAO loose to investigate. One possibility: 
GAO could be asked to determine under what circumstances and for 
what reasons the DOJ and the FBI decided to re-open closed 
investigations of Hillary Clinton, after President Trump publicly called 
for that action. 
F. Mission Statements or Job Descriptions Emphasizing Apolitical, 
Impartial Norms 
Congress sometimes formally articulates the mission of agencies or 
offices. The Department of Homeland Security, to take one example, 
has a statutory mission that includes affirmative areas of responsibility 
— including to “prevent terrorist attacks within the United States” — 
as well as guidance on how responsibilities should be carried out — to 
“ensure that the civil rights and civil liberties of persons are not 
diminished by efforts, activities, and programs aimed at securing the 
homeland.”170 Congress can also use statutory mission statements to 
emphasize the independence of an independent agency.171 Either or 
both of DOJ and the FBI could be given statutory mission statements 
of this kind, emphasizing the need for impartial, apolitical law 
enforcement. 
Similarly, when Congress creates an office, it often describes the 
responsibilities and authorities of that office. Congress can use this as 
an opportunity to emphasize important norms. For example, Congress 
has specified that the Director of National Intelligence must provide to 
the President, heads of executive departments, and Congress “national 
intelligence” that is “timely, objective, independent of political 
considerations, and based upon all sources available to the intelligence 
community.”172 Using this statute as a drafting example, Congress 
could specify the law enforcement and national security functions of 
the Attorney General, FBI Director, or both, and state that they should 
be carried out in an objective, independent manner that is free from 
political considerations. 
 
 170 6 U.S.C. § 111(b)(1)(E). 
 171 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2286a(a) (“The mission of the [Defense Nuclear Facilities 
Safety] Board shall be to provide independent analysis, advice, and recommendations 
to the Secretary of Energy to inform the Secretary . . . in providing adequate protection 
of public health and safety at such defense nuclear facilities.”). 
 172 50 U.S.C. § 3024(a)(1)-(2).  
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Would such a statutory mission statement or norm-based job 
description be simply useless “cheap talk”173 by Congress? Without 
overselling the effects of such a move, congressional statements of this 
kind could plausibly have a number of benefits. It would communicate 
expectations to leadership and staff at the FBI about independence and 
impartiality, helping further inculcate those values in the culture, and 
giving a concrete statutory reference to help them push back against 
improper requests or contacts by, say, the White House. It could be a 
useful focal point for overseeing and measuring the performance of the 
FBI by Congress, the press, and the public. It would also put the 
White House on notice about congressional expectations, in the same 
way a “sense of Congress” resolution discussed above would. 
G. Codifying a Policy on White House-DOJ Contacts 
President Carter and his first Attorney General, Griffin Bell, were 
both committed to separating the DOJ’s investigative and prosecutorial 
functions from any White House interference. In a major policy 
speech in 1978, Bell conceded that “the partisan activities of some 
Attorneys General in this century, combined with the unfortunate 
legacy of Watergate, have given rise to an understandable public 
concern that some decisions at Justice may be the products of favor, or 
pressure, or politics.”174 To ensure that, in reality and appearance, DOJ 
lawyers could exercise their independent professional judgments free 
from pressure or politics, Bell announced that henceforth: 
[A]ll communications about particular [civil or criminal] 
cases, from Members of Congress or their staffs, or members of 
the White House staff, should be referred to my office, or the 
offices of the Deputy or the Associate Attorney General. It will 
be our job to screen these communications to insure that any 
improper attempts to influence a decision do not reach 
division heads,175 
much less their subordinates. 
When Benjamin Civiletti replaced Bell as Attorney General later in 
Carter’s term, he distilled the Bell policies into a more succinct 
 
 173 This is a term from game theory, meaning communication that imposes no 
direct cost on the sender or receiver. See, e.g., Joseph Farrell & Matthew Rabin, Cheap 
Talk, 10 J. ECON. PERSP. 103, 104 (1996). 
 174 Bell Address, supra note 23, at 3. 
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memorandum.176 White Houses have had their own policies too, 
which strictly limit the number of people authorized to contact the 
DOJ about pending or impending matters. These policies were 
followed during the Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and Clinton 
presidencies. 
White House-DOJ coordination on policy matters is basically always 
appropriate, and not covered by these policies. In addition, the 
policies allowed contacts, where necessary to carrying out the 
President’s constitutional responsibilities and occurring through 
appropriate channels.177 As a recent study explained, 
For example, the White House Counsel might discuss a 
pending Supreme Court case with the Solicitor General, 
request a formal legal opinion from the Office of Legal 
Counsel, or discuss clemency matters with the Pardon 
Attorney. Similarly, on national security matters, it is expected 
that the FBI will be in regular contact with the National 
Security Advisor and his staff on matters of national security, 
which could include information about ongoing 
investigations.178 
During the George W. Bush administration, both the DOJ and the 
White House significantly relaxed their policies. The number of White 
House officials allowed to contact the DOJ on non-national security 
matters increased from four to 417, and eventually to 895.179 A scandal 
about politicization of law enforcement was the predictable result. 
Attorney General Alberto Gonzales ended up resigning after the fall-
out from the highly unusual mid-term removal of nine U.S. Attorneys, 
in contexts in which politics seemed plausibly to be involved.180 Bush’s 
final attorney general, Michael Mukasey, reinstated stricter controls,181 
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which were reiterated during President Obama’s tenure.182 Vermeule 
cites this as an example of conventional agency independence — U.S. 
Attorneys, in theory, are at-will employees of the President, but a 
strong norm had developed which protected them from mid-term 
firing, especially for political reasons.183 
The Trump administration started to flagrantly violate these policies 
within days of taking office.184 Given the bipartisan agreement that 
these norms about White House-DOJ contacts and interference are 
necessary and appropriate,185 Congress could usefully intervene here 
to strengthen them. Rather than dictating the precise content of a 
policy, it might be wiser for Congress to legislate a requirement that 
the Attorney General promulgate regulations via a notice-and-
comment process. This would allow public involvement in 
deliberations about the appropriate rules, and would give greater 
flexibility to change them as appropriate in the future. Congress could, 
however, require that any such regulations take as their overriding 
goal the protection of DOJ (including FBI) neutrality, non-
partisanship, and independence from White House and congressional 
interference on pending or impending civil or criminal matters — 
with appropriate exceptions for instances of the type noted above 
(e.g., discussions with the Solicitor General about matters of legal 
policy in a case pending in the Supreme Court). Especially if the 
statutory delegation included a statement that the regulations allow 
sufficient flexibility for the President to carry out his or her 
constitutional responsibilities, it is hard to see how this type of 
congressional intervention could be criticized on constitutional 
grounds. Congress might also specify that violations of the regulations 
must be reported to relevant committees of Congress and the 
Department of Justice Inspector General. A useful bill embodying this 
requirement was introduced in the Senate in 2007.186 
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H. Added Duties for DOJ Inspector General 
One of the important congressional reforms of the 1970s was to 
install inspectors general in many executive agencies, tasked with 
investigating and reporting to both Congress and agency heads on 
fraud, waste, abuse, and employee misconduct.187 Additional 
inspectors general were added over time.188 These are powerful offices. 
Except with respect to certain very sensitive issues — for example, 
ongoing criminal investigations within DOJ — agency heads may not 
prevent inspectors general from carrying out any investigative or 
auditing function which the inspector has deemed appropriate.189 
Reporting to Congress is mandatory,190 making inspectors general a 
uniquely-positioned oversight tool for the legislature.191 
The DOJ Inspector General is already empowered to investigate 
politicization of law enforcement, and related issues about 
independence and impartiality.192 For example, when senior political 
leadership at DOJ ordered the firing of nine U.S. Attorneys in 2006 — 
a highly unusual move, because U.S. Attorneys by tradition are 
replaced at the beginning of a President’s term and then remain in 
office for the duration — the Inspector General, along with the DOJ 
Office of Personnel Management, conducted a comprehensive 
investigation. The investigation focused on “whether [the U.S. 
Attorneys] were removed for partisan political purposes, or to 
influence an investigation or prosecution, or to retaliate for their 
actions in any specific investigation or prosecution.”193 
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Congress could consider confirming that law enforcement 
independence is and should remain an important part of the remit of 
the DOJ Inspector General through a statutory amendment. The 
inspector general of DOJ already has qualified access to investigative 
and prosecutorial documents and testimony,194 and any new 
legislation touching this area should be sensitive to legitimate 
executive concerns about privilege and confidentiality. 
I. Ensure that a Senate-Confirmed Officer Always Heads the DOJ 
After President Trump forced the resignation of Attorney General 
Jeff Sessions, Trump invoked the Federal Vacancies Reform Act 
(“FVRA”) to install Matthew Whitaker, who had been serving as chief 
of staff to Sessions, as the Acting Attorney General.195 Whitaker’s post 
had not required Senate confirmation. Based on Whitaker’s public 
statements prior to taking the job and other sources, it was widely 
assumed that President Trump chose Whitaker to rein in the special 
counsel probe of Trump-Russia collusion headed by Robert Mueller.196 
Whitaker’s thin resume exacerbates the concerns about the reasons for 
the appointment. As Alexander Hamilton explained in The Federalist, 
the requirement of the Senate’s concurrence was designed to prevent 
the President from appointing to significant offices a person “in some 
way or other personally allied to him, or of possessing the necessary 
insignificance and pliancy to render them the obsequious instruments 
of his pleasure.”197 Congress should consider amending the FVRA to 
clarify that it does not displace a DOJ-specific statute currently on the 
books, which establishes a line of succession for an absent Attorney 
General involving only Senate-confirmed DOJ officials.198 
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III. PART TWO OF THE MENU: MORE CONSTITUTIONALLY AGGRESSIVE 
OPTIONS FOR CONGRESS 
This Part analyzes the constitutionality of two kinds of measures for 
Congress that would likely have more “bite” than the ones in Part II: 
statutory qualifications for senior DOJ officials and statutory 
requirement that the FBI Director may only be removed by the 
President for good cause. I have omitted a treatment of potential 
legislation to supplement DOJ special counsel regulations and further 
protect a special counsel from unjustified removal because bills have 
already been introduced and the constitutional issues have already 
been ably covered by other commentators.199 
A. Appointment: Statutory Qualifications or Eligibility Rules for Senior 
DOJ Roles 
One way that Congress could attempt to protect the independence 
and impartiality of the DOJ and FBI is by setting qualifications or 
eligibility rules for the persons whom the President may select for 
agency leadership. Currently, the Attorney General, Deputy Attorney 
General, Associate Attorney General, Solicitor General, Assistant 
Attorneys General, U.S. Attorneys, and FBI Director are selected by the 
President with the advice and consent of the Senate. None of the 
offices currently have any statutory qualifications or eligibility rules 
for nominees. 
Congress has very broad authority to prescribe the qualifications or 
rules of eligibility for executive office-holders, and has exercised this 
power frequently since the beginning of government under the 
Constitution.200 The Judiciary Act of 1789 required that the Attorney 
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General be a “meet” person, meaning qualified or appropriate for the 
job, “learned in the law.”201 
Statutory qualifications or rules of eligibility take many different 
forms, serving different purposes. Congress frequently specifies 
qualifications for the heads of independent regulatory agencies or 
bureaus, who are appointed by the President with Senate advice and 
consent. Partisan balance requirements for multi-member 
commissions or boards were noted above.202 Inspectors general must 
be appointed “without regard to political affiliation.”203 Congress often 
dictates that nominees have certain skills or experience.204 Sometimes 
Congress requires that nominees not be current holders of any other 
office under the United States.205 Sometimes it requires good 
character.206 Sometimes a certain attitude toward the agency mission is 
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shall be individuals who, by demonstrated ability, background, training, or experience 
are especially qualified to carry out the functions of the Board.”); 12 U.S.C. 
§ 4512(b)(1) (“The Director [of the Federal Housing Finance Agency] shall be 
appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, from 
among individuals who are citizens of the United States, have a demonstrated 
understanding of financial management or oversight, and have a demonstrated 
understanding of capital markets, including the mortgage securities markets and 
housing finance.”); 15 U.S.C. § 2053(a) (“In making such appointments [to be 
commissioners of the Consumer Products Safety Commission], the President shall 
consider individuals who, by reason of their background and expertise in areas related 
to consumer products and protection of the public from risks to safety, are qualified to 
serve as members of the Commission.”). 
 205 See, e.g., 52 U.S.C. § 30106(a)(3) (“Members [of the Federal Election 
Commission] . . . shall be individuals who, at the time appointed to the Commission, 
are not elected or appointed officers or employees in the executive, legislative, or 
judicial branch of the Federal Government.”).  
 206 5 U.S.C. app. § 3(a) (requiring that inspector general appointments be made 
“without regard to political affiliation and solely on the basis of integrity and 
demonstrated ability in accounting, auditing, financial analysis, law, management 
analysis, public administration, or investigations”); see, e.g., 52 U.S.C. § 30106(a)(3) 
(requiring that members of the FEC “be chosen on the basis of their experience, 
integrity, impartiality, and good judgment”). 
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prescribed.207 Geographic and industry-background requirements are 
sometimes imposed on multi-member agency heads.208 
Even the heads of some purely executive agencies have 
qualifications prescribed by Congress. The Secretary of Defense must 
be “appointed from civilian life by the President,” and be at least seven 
years removed from active duty in the armed forces.209 The Director of 
National Intelligence “shall have extensive national security 
expertise.”210 The U.S. Trade Representative, whose office is located 
within the Executive Office of the President, may not have previously 
represented or advised a foreign entity in a trade dispute with the 
United States.211 The head of the Federal Aviation Administration 
must be “a civilian; and . . . have experience in a field directly related 
to aviation.”212 And a number of offices just below the top of purely 
executive agencies also have statutory qualifications or eligibility rules. 
For instance, the general counsels of the Central Intelligence Agency 
and Department of Defense must be “appointed from civilian life.”213 
The constitutional law on statutory qualifications for executive 
officers is generous toward congressional regulation. Appointments to 
federal executive office are, in the first instance, governed by the 
Appointments Clause of the Constitution. The Clause provides: 
The President . . . shall nominate, and by and with the Advice 
and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other 
public Ministers and Consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, 
and all other Officers of the United States, whose 
Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and 
which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by 
Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they 
 
 207 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 633(b)(1) (“The management of the [Small Business] 
Administration shall be vested in an Administrator who shall be appointed from 
civilian life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and 
who shall be a person of outstanding qualifications known to be familiar and 
sympathetic with small-business needs and problems.”). 
 208 See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 241 (“In selecting the members of the [Federal Reserve] 
Board, not more than one of whom shall be selected from any one Federal Reserve 
district, the President shall have due regard to a fair representation of the financial, 
agricultural, industrial, and commercial interests, and geographical divisions of the 
country.”).  
 209 10 U.S.C. § 113(a). 
 210 50 U.S.C. § 3023(a)(1). 
 211 19 U.S.C. § 2171(a), (b)(4). 
 212 49 U.S.C. § 106(c)(2)-(3). 
 213 10 U.S.C. § 140(a); 50 U.S.C. § 3520(a). 
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think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or 
in the Heads of Departments.214 
All officials who “exercis[e] significant authority pursuant to the laws 
of the United States” are Officers of the United States “and must, 
therefore, be appointed in the manner prescribed by” the 
Appointments Clause.215 
The Clause makes a distinction between “inferior officers” and what 
are called principal officers. “By vesting the President with the 
exclusive power to select the principal (noninferior) officers of the 
United States, the Appointments Clause prevents congressional 
encroachment upon the Executive and Judicial Branches.”216 The 
check of Senate advice and consent “serves both to curb Executive 
abuses of the appointment power, and ‘to promote a judicious choice 
of [persons] for filling the offices of the union.’”217 
Modern doctrine on appointment qualifications appears to be that, 
while Congress may not give itself a direct role in appointing 
executive officials who will be wielding executive power,218 reasonable 
and relevant statutory qualifications or eligibility for senior executive 
officers, whether principal or inferior, are constitutional. The Supreme 
Court does not have a merits holding on the issue.219 So “[t]here is no 
settled constitutional rule that determines how . . . the power of the 
Congress to prescribe qualifications and the power of the President to 
 
 214 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 215 Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 169-70 (1994) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 
424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976)). 
 216 Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 659 (1997). 
 217 Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 76, at 386-87 (Alexander Hamilton) (M. Beloff 
ed., 1987)). The Court has not always been very clear about where the line between 
principal and inferior officers lies. See id. at 661 (“Our cases have not set forth an 
exclusive criterion for distinguishing between principal and inferior officers for 
Appointments Clause purposes.”). This line is most important if Congress has 
provided a means of appointment other than by the President with Senate advice and 
consent — this is unconstitutional unless the officer is inferior. In addition to looking 
at the jurisdiction, powers, and tenure of an officer, see Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 
654, 671-72 (1988), the Court has also announced that the primary marker of inferior 
officer status is subordination: “[W]e think it evident that ‘inferior officers’ are officers 
whose work is directed and supervised at some level by others who were appointed by 
Presidential nomination with the advice and consent of the Senate.” Edmond, 520 U.S. 
at 663. 
 218 See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976). 
 219 See Matthew A. Samberg, Note, “Established by Law”: Saving Statutory 
Limitations on Presidential Appointments from Unconstitutionality, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1735, 1737 (2010) (“[T]he Supreme Court has never examined the practice of 
restricting by statute the President’s choice of nominees for federal offices . . . .”). 
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appoint . . . are to be reconciled.”220 But in Myers v. United States, one 
of its most formalist, pro-executive decisions on separation of powers 
and presidential control over senior executive officials, the Court 
noted in dicta: 
To Congress under its legislative power is given the 
establishment of offices, the determination of their functions 
and jurisdiction, the prescribing of reasonable and relevant 
qualifications and rules of eligibility of appointees, and the 
fixing of the term for which they are to be appointed . . . all 
except as otherwise provided by the Constitution.221 
The only limitation — besides reasonableness and relevance — that 
the Myers Court indicated was that the qualifications and rules of 
eligibility “do not so limit selection and so trench upon executive 
choice as to be in effect legislative designation.”222 
More recently, Justice Scalia’s famous dissent in the independent 
counsel case did not take issue with Congress having prescribed 
qualifications for the office.223 And a concurring opinion by Justice 
Stevens in another major separation of powers case drew no objection 
from other justices when it stated that “it is entirely proper for 
Congress to specify the qualifications for an office that it has 
created.”224 
 
 220 Judges — Appointment — Age Factor, 3 Op. O.L.C. 388, 389 (1979). 
 221 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 129 (1926). 
 222 Id. at 126. 
 223 See e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 706-07 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
For the statutory language at issue in Morrison, see 28 U.S.C. § 593(b)(2) (expired 
1999) (“The division of the court shall appoint as independent counsel an individual 
who has appropriate experience and who will conduct the investigation and any 
prosecution in a prompt, responsible, and cost-effective manner. . . . The division of 
the court may not appoint as an independent counsel any person who holds any office 
of profit or trust under the United States.”). 
 224 Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 740 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring). There are 
a few sources perhaps hinting at exclusivity of presidential control over appointments, 
but which do not address the question in the context of congressional regulation. See, 
e.g., Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 483 (1989) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (“No role whatsoever is given either to the Senate or to Congress as a 
whole in the process of choosing the person who will be nominated for 
appointment.”); THE FEDERALIST No. 76, at 456-57 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton 
Rossiter ed., 1961) (“In the act of nomination, [the President’s] judgment alone would 
be exercised; and as it would be his sole duty to point out the man who, with the 
approbation of the Senate, should fill an office, his responsibility would be as 
complete as if he were to make the final appointment.”); James Monroe, Message to 
the Senate of the United States (Apr. 13, 1822), in 2 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES 
AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 698, 701 (James D. Richardson ed., 1908) (“[A]s a 
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In separation of powers cases, the Court often gives weight to well-
entrenched practices accepted by both Presidents and Congresses.225 
There have now been over two centuries of practice in which Congress 
has imposed a very wide range of qualifications and rules of eligibility 
on executive appointments and the executive branch has, with very 
few exceptions, complied with them, starting in 1789. Precedents 
established by the first Congress have been found highly persuasive on 
the original understanding of the Constitution “since many of the 
Members of the First Congress had taken part in framing that 
instrument.”226 The Court has also applied this principle to other early 
Congresses.227 
Notwithstanding the strong doctrinal and customary case for 
constitutionality, the modern executive branch and some scholars 
have questioned the constitutionality of some or all qualifications or 
eligibility rules for executive officials, whether principal or inferior. 
Some Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”) or Attorney General opinions 
have conceded the constitutionality of qualifications so long as they 
are reasonable and relevant and do not “rul[e] out a large portion of 
those persons best qualified by experience and knowledge to fill a 
particular office.”228 President Clinton and his OLC objected to the 
statutory qualification for the appointment of a U.S. trade 
representative — never having represented a foreign entity in a trade 
dispute against the United States — because it ruled out a large 
 
general principle . . . Congress ha[s] no right under the Constitution to impose any 
restraint by law on the power granted to the President so as to prevent his making a 
free selection of proper persons for these offices from the whole body of his fellow 
citizens.”). 
 225 See, e.g., NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2559 (2014) (“Long settled 
and established practice is a consideration of great weight in a proper interpretation of 
constitutional provisions regulating the relationship between Congress and the 
President.”); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 401 (1989) (“‘[T]raditional ways 
of conducting government . . . give meaning’ to the Constitution.” (quoting 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring))). 
 226 Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 723-24; accord Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting 
Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 492 (2010). 
 227 See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401 (1819); Stuart v. 
Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299, 309 (1803). 
 228 Presidential Statement on Signing the Department of Homeland Security 
Appropriations Act 2007, 42 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1742, 1742-43 (Oct. 4, 2006); 
Constitutionality of Statute Governing Appointment of U.S. Trade Representative, 20 
Op. O.L.C. 279, 280 (1996); see also Military Acad. —Appointment — Statutory 
Construction, 25 Op. Att’y Gen. 341, 343 (1905); Civil Serv. Comm’n, 13 Op. Att’y 
Gen. 516, 520-21, 525 (1871).  
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number of otherwise-desirable candidates.229 And both the executive 
branch and some scholars have questioned the constitutionality of 
partisan balance requirements for multi-member commissions or 
boards heading independent agencies.230 
Sometimes the executive has taken a harder line on all qualifications 
for executive officers. During the Carter administration, OLC 
“question[ed] the validity of the requirement” in a bill establishing 
inspectors general in executive agencies “that the President appoint 
each Inspector General ‘without regard to political affiliation’” because 
“[t]his implies some limitation on the appointment power in addition 
to the advice and consent of the Senate.”231 The implication that any 
limitation on the appointment power is unconstitutional is, frankly, 
hard to take seriously. OLC reiterated this extreme view during the 
George H.W. Bush administration.232 
A few commentators join these executive opinions in finding some 
exclusive and illimitable power in the Appointments Clause for the 
President to choose any candidate he or she desires. But these 
arguments contradict constitutional practice since 1789, and 
furthermore do not agree on key issues such as whether their theory of 
total presidential discretion applies to appointment of principal 
officers, inferior officers, or both.233 In my estimation, there is very 
wide room for Congress to prescribe qualifications or rules of 
eligibility without crossing the line of unconstitutionality.234 
Building on proposals made during the 1970s reform period, and 
language in some current statutes, I suggest a number of different 
statutory provisions and the comment on their likely constitutionality. 
 
 229 See Statute Governing Appointment, 20 Op. O.L.C. at 279-80; Presidential 
Statement on Signing the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1907, 1907 
(Dec. 19, 1995). 
 230 BREGER & EDLES, supra note 46, at 96-97. 
 231 Inspector Gen. Legislation, 1 Op. O.L.C. 16, 18 n.3 (1977), 1977 WL 18011. 
 232 See Common Legislative Encroachments on Exec. Branch Authority, 13 Op. 
O.L.C. 248, 250 (1989), 1989 WL 595833. 
 233 Compare Hanah Metchis Volokh, The Two Appointments Clauses: Statutory 
Qualifications for Federal Officers, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 745, 746 (2008) (arguing “that 
statutory requirements are unconstitutional for all appointments that require the 
advice and consent of the Senate”), with Michael J. Gerhardt, Toward a Comprehensive 
Understanding of the Federal Appointments Process, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 467, 534-
35 (1998) (arguing that statutory qualifications for inferior officers are 
unconstitutional, and that statutory qualifications for principal officers are sometimes 
unconstitutional and sometimes not). 
 234 See also E. Garrett West, Note, Congressional Power Over Office Creation, 128 
YALE L.J. 166, 201-05 (2018) (arguing primarily on textual and structural grounds for 
very broad authority of Congress to prescribe qualifications for offices).  
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1. Good Character 
Similar to provisions for the Federal Election Commission and 
inspectors general within agencies, Congress could require that the 
most senior DOJ officials — the Attorney General, Deputy Attorney 
General, Associate Attorney General, Solicitor General, FBI Director, 
or U.S. Attorneys — have demonstrated “integrity, impartiality, and 
good judgment.” I cannot imagine a valid constitutional objection to 
such a statute. It certainly might be objected that such qualifications 
are so vague as to be useless. I will not argue that the proposal would 
be significantly impactful, but it does seem plausible to say that it 
would give the Senate during confirmation hearings, as well as the 
press and public, a useful — if admittedly very vague — measuring 
stick with which to interrogate the character and career of nominees. 
2. Law Enforcement Experience 
The officials who head DOJ and the U.S. Attorneys offices have jobs 
which range beyond criminal law enforcement, and so a rigid 
requirement that they possess law enforcement experience would be 
unwise. But the FBI directorship is different. Law enforcement is a 
primary mission, alongside the intelligence functions. Requiring some 
law enforcement experience seems relevant and reasonable. 
In 1973, Senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson proposed a bill that would 
have required the FBI Director to have “extensive professional 
experience in the field of law enforcement of and at least 10 years of 
experience in a responsible position with the FBI itself.”235 This seems 
too rigid to me, both as a policy matter and under the relevant 
constitutional test, because it would drastically restrict the pool of 
candidates the President could choose from. No FBI Director in 
history, acting or permanent, met Jackson’s requirement of ten years’ 
prior experience at a senior level of the Bureau. 
But a statute that, for example, required “experience in the field of 
criminal justice” seems reasonable and almost certainly constitutional. 
In theory, it reduces the President’s pool of potential candidates 
significantly, but in reality the limitation is very mild. All acting and 
confirmed Bureau directors in the post-Hoover era — totaling fifteen 
people — met the qualification I proposed, through service either in 
law enforcement, as a prosecutor or Department of Justice supervisor, 
or as a judge with criminal jurisdiction. So looking at the pool a 
President would (or should) be actually choosing from, there is not 
 
 235 119 CONG. REC. 11353 (1973). 
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much restriction at all. In that case, it might be superfluous to pass a 
statute requiring something that modern Presidents have always done 
voluntarily. My response is the same as above: it would not hurt and it 
might help. Since the FBI has dramatically increased its intelligence 
mission since 9/11, it probably also would make sense for Congress to 
stipulate that the Bureau’s director have national security experience 
as well. 
3. Appointment Without Regard to Political Affiliation 
I suggested above that one of the norms which emerged from the 
1970s was that the job of Attorney General involves such a large 
element of policy choice that it is appropriate for Presidents to select 
someone who will reflect their own policy views.236 For that reason, I 
will not propose that the DOJ’s senior leadership should be required to 
be chosen without regard to their political affiliation. 
But the cases of the FBI Director and, arguably, U.S. Attorneys are 
different. While it is proper for the President to want an FBI Director 
who will be “responsive[] to the broad policies of the Executive 
Branch,”237 Congress’s decision to set a ten-year term on the office — 
longer than any one President may serve — clearly indicates the 
congressional view that the Director has “non-political . . . 
responsibilities” and is “not an ordinary Cabinet appointment which is 
usually considered a politically oriented member of the President’s 
‘team.’”238 This norm has widespread support.239 Given this choice, 
which was acquiesced in by the executive branch from 1976 until the 
Trump presidency, Congress could consider going one step further and 
directing that, like inspectors general already, the FBI Director be 
appointed “without regard to political affiliation.” Cross-partisan 
appointments of FBI Directors have historically been a very strong 
signal of presidential commitment to law enforcement independence.240 
Requiring cross-partisanship by statute might go too far in constraining 
the President’s choices, but requiring that the holder of an inherently 
 
 236 See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 237 See S. REP. NO. 93-1213, at 2 (1974).  
 238 Id. at 2-3. 
 239 See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 240 Bill Clinton appointed Republican Louis Freeh to be FBI Director in 1993. 
Barack Obama appointment two Republicans to the Bureau, first by seeking 
congressional approval for extending the term of Robert Mueller, who had been first 
appointed by President George W. Bush, and second by appointing James Comey.  
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nonpolitical job be selected without regard to politics is likely to be 
found a reasonable and relevant qualification, and hence constitutional. 
U.S. Attorneys may be a somewhat harder case. Congress has 
recognized the right of Presidents to have their preferred nominees in 
that job by giving them a four-year term in office to match the 
Presidents and by expressly providing that “[e]ach United States 
attorney is subject to removal by the President.”241 But, unlike DOJ 
leadership in Washington, the core job of U.S. Attorneys is to 
prosecute and defend specific criminal and civil cases.242 As discussed 
above, the norm is that specific-party matters should always be 
conducted in an apolitical and impartial manner, and nearly always in 
a way that is independent of the White House or other politically-
responsive actors. In my view, required non-partisan appointment of 
U.S. Attorneys would likely be constitutional. 
4. Barring Cronies or Politically Active Persons from Senior DOJ 
Roles 
Responding to the perceived politicization of the DOJ, some 1970s 
reformers proposed barring persons who had worked on presidential 
campaigns from serving in senior leadership roles in the 
Department.243 For years there had been grumbling that senior 
presidential campaign aides and longstanding political or personal 
friends of the President — for example, Homer Cummings for 
President Roosevelt, Howard McGrath for President Truman, Herbert 
Brownell, Jr., for President Eisenhower, and Robert Kennedy for 
President Kennedy — were being given the extremely sensitive and 
important job of Attorney General of the United States.244 The 
Watergate experience and criminal conviction of Nixon’s first two 
Attorneys General, Joseph Mitchell and Richard Kleindienst, 
crystallized these complaints. Both had heavily political backgrounds, 
and Mitchell was also a longstanding friend and law partner of the 
President he served. 
It was not unnoticed that a number of the more respected Attorneys 
General during this era — Robert Jackson, Francis Biddle, Tom Clark, 
William Rogers, and Nicholas Katzenbach — tended to have much 
more minimal experience in electoral politics and less close, 
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confidential relationships with the President before coming into the 
office. 
In 1967, responding to the Kennedy experience, Congress enacted 
an anti-nepotism statute which bars the President (and other officials) 
from appointing relatives “to a civilian position in [an] agency” which 
the appointing official serves in, controls, or has jurisdiction over.245 
Executive agencies and departments, and independent regulatory 
agencies, are covered by the statute.246 More limits on appointments, 
specifically at the DOJ, were also proposed in the aftermath of 
Watergate. 
In 1975, the final report of the Watergate Special Prosecution Force 
recommended that the Attorney General and other senior DOJ 
appointees not be confirmed by the Senate if the nominee had served 
“as a President’s campaign manager or in a similar high-level campaign 
role.”247 A special committee of the American Bar Association, tasked 
with studying how to remove improper political influence on federal 
law enforcement, made a similar proposal, stating that Congress 
should legislate to prevent a person who had held “the position of 
campaign manager [for the President-elect], chairman of the finance 
committee, chairman of the national political party, or other high level 
campaign role involved in electing the President” from serving as AG 
or DAG.248 
Senator Lloyd Bentsen (Democrat from Texas) in 1975 introduced 
the Justice Department Reform Act. Lamenting that the trend of 
President’s appointing senior political campaign advisers “contributes 
to a growing perception of the Justice Department as a political 
instrument,”249 he proposed barring people who held senior positions 
on the presidential campaign staff or in state or national political party 
organizations be banned from nomination by the President they served 
 
 245 5 U.S.C. § 3110(b). 
 246 Id. § 3110(a)(1)(A) (defining “agency” as an “Executive agency”); 5 U.S.C. 
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for Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General, Associate Attorney 
General, and Solicitor General.250 
This bill did not make it out of the Judiciary Committee, but 
Bentsen kept pushing the concept as amendments to other 
legislation.251 Eventually the Senate, with bipartisan approval and no 
need for a roll call, adopted a revised version as an amendment to 
what became the Ethics in Government Act of 1978.252 
Although the Bentsen amendment dealt with a Senate prerogative — 
consideration of executive nominations — the House stripped it out 
during the House-Senate conference process.253 It may well have been 
thought by some members of Congress that, for good or ill, Presidents 
needed to be free to choose their own person for such an important 
role as Attorney General.254 Likely some momentum in favor of the 
Bentsen reform was lost because since Watergate, President Ford had 
appointed the universally-respected, apolitical, and independent 
Edward Levi, president of the University of Chicago, to be his attorney 
general,255 and President Carter had appointed a well-respected former 
judge, Griffin Bell.256 During the 1976 campaign, candidate Carter 
promised an “independent” DOJ, going so far as to propose that 
Attorneys General serve a five-year term, so that it not be coterminous 
with the President’s.257 It probably seemed that the lesson had been 
 
 250 Id. (statement of Sen. Bentsen).  
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learned and a new, positive norm of Attorney General independence 
from politics and the White House instantiated.258 
But in retrospect, the new direction of independence for Attorneys 
General from politics and White House influence was short-lived. For 
example, William French Smith, Reagan’s first attorney general, was 
the personal lawyer, business advisor, and close political confidante of 
Reagan dating back to the early 1960s.259 Edwin Meese, who replaced 
Smith in 1985, had served in political roles for Governor Reagan from 
1967–1974, and was chief of staff of the 1980 presidential campaign, 
“counselor to the president” during the first term, and was a close 
friend of Reagan.260 Senate Democrats opposed Meese for a variety of 
reasons, including violation of the principle of the Bentsen 
amendment, which had been agreed to by senators by both parties 
only seven years previously.261 
Since then, some Attorneys General have been partisan political 
figures or presidential cronies (for example, Alberto Gonzales, 
Jefferson Beauregard Sessions III), while others have had more 
independent and apolitical biographies prior to assuming the office 
(for example, Janet Reno and Loretta Lynch).262 The record of 
Attorneys General with partisan backgrounds is somewhat mixed, 
because some demonstrated real independence in office (for example, 
John Ashcroft). Cronies — such as Mitchell or Meese — seem to have 
been more likely to be disappointing in office. 
It would be useful for Congress to debate and consider a version of 
the Bentsen amendment for the Attorney General and perhaps Deputy 
and Associate Attorneys General also; I will not prejudge where that 
debate should end up. 
I see the FBI Director as being differently situated, however. 
Compared to the Attorney General’s job, the FBI Directorship has 
been and should remain substantially less political and less tied to the 
 
 258 See Joseph Kraft, The Rising of Lowered Expectations, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 1975), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1975/08/03/archives/the-rising-of-lowered-expectations-
one-year-of-ford-ford.html (noting that Levi was “the first Attorney General in 50 
years who does not come from a heavily political background”). 
 259 CORNELL W. CLAYTON, THE POLITICS OF JUSTICE: THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND THE 
MAKING OF LEGAL POLICY 51-52 (1992); Edward J. Boyer, William French Smith, 73, 
Dies; Reagan Adviser and Atty. Gen., L.A. TIMES (Oct. 30, 1990), 
http://articles.latimes.com/1990-10-30/local/me-3410_1_william-french-smith. 
 260 See CLAYTON, supra note 259, at 51-52. 
 261 See Nomination of Edwin Meese III, supra note 253, at 7. 
 262 See Attorneys General of the United States, U.S. DEP’T JUST., 
https://www.justice.gov/ag/historical-bios (providing brief biographies of attorneys 
general). 
  
1980 University of California, Davis [Vol. 52:1927 
White House. Precluding political campaign aides or recently-active 
politicians from heading the Bureau seems highly relevant to reducing 
the possibility for actual or perceived politicization of law 
enforcement. No Senate confirmed FBI Director in history would have 
been excluded from consideration by such a rule. No permanent 
director of the FBI has ever held elective office, been a senior aide on a 
presidential campaign, or a close friend or confidante of the 
appointing President. Two acting directors had brief careers in state 
legislatures long before their temporary service at the head of the 
Bureau. The disgraced Patrick Gray, acting FBI Director under Nixon, 
had worked on Nixon’s 1968 campaign and been rewarded with 
appointment as Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Division.263 
This record strikes me as good evidence that the suggested 
qualifications would not be unduly restrictive but could screen out 
people who have no business being FBI Director. 
B. Removal: Good-Cause Limitation on the President’s Power to Remove 
the FBI Director 
The Supreme Court and most scholars agree that at-will tenure at 
the President’s pleasure makes agency heads and other senior 
executive officials more susceptible to White House direction and 
control,264 and that the converse is also true — limiting the President’s 
power to dismiss is an effective check on White House direction and 
control.265 There are many ways Congress can limit the President’s 
ability to remove senior executive officials. The most effective and 
aggressive technique is to specify by statute a for-cause requirement 
before removal may occur, like the provision in the organic statutes of 
many independent agencies.266 A common formulation recites that 
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agency heads may not be removed by the President except for 
“inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.”267 This directly 
confronts the President with a congressional restriction on his 
constitutional powers over the executive branch personnel. This kind 
of statutory restriction on removal is frequently said to be the most 
important marker of agency independence.268 
A second possibility is a wrinkle on the first: for Congress to require 
notice and a hearing, either administrative or judicial, on whether 
good cause for removal is present before removal may occur.269 A 
milder version of this — a third possibility — is to require, upon 
removal, a public statement of reasons.270 This requirement is 
obviously intended to disincentivize removals other than for publicly-
acceptable good causes. 
A fourth possibility is exemplified by the now-lapsed independent 
counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978. Congress 
there provided that the Attorney General, not the President, could 
remove the independent counsel and “only for good cause, physical or 
mental disability . . . or any other condition that substantially impairs 
the performance of such independent counsel’s duties.”271 A fifth 
option is to specify a term of years for which the official may hold the 
office. Early on, it was thought that such a statutory term precluded 
the President from removing the official prior to the term’s 
expiration.272 (Note that impeachment and removal by Congress is 
always an option for removing an executive officer.) But later in the 
nineteenth century, the Court held that only “very clear and explicit 
language” in a statute limiting removal could overcome the 
presumption that the President’s constitutional power to remove at-
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will was unimpaired.273 Even if a term of years is not a legal 
impediment to removal, it can be part of a sixth congressional 
strategy: to signal to the President that removal except for good cause 
would be disfavored, and could lead to costly political backlash, such 
as difficulty confirming a successor, without imposing any legal bar on 
removal. This was how Congress approached the position of the FBI 
Director in the 1970s;274 Congress’s un-enacted policy preference 
stuck until 2017, when President Trump decided to fire FBI Director 
Comey. 
In the following subsections, I review congressional debates and 
proposals in the 1970s about how to preserve independence of the FBI 
Director, and then evaluate the constitutionality of a requirement that 
the FBI Director may be fired by the President only for good cause. 
1. Congressional Debates in the 1970s About FBI Director 
Independence 
Congress considered statutory reform of the FBI starting in 1973. 
Reformers focused on lengthening the tenure of the FBI Director and 
imposing statutory removal restrictions. A lengthy but definite term 
would allow the director to accumulate experience, without 
perpetuating him- or herself in office the way Hoover did as Director. 
A term longer than that which any President might serve would both 
symbolically and practically remove the director somewhat from 
political whirlwinds.275 
In April 1973, Senator Robert Byrd, the Democratic Majority Whip, 
introduced The Federal Bureau of Investigation Improvement Act.276 
The bill established the FBI “as an independent establishment of the 
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executive branch,” headed by a Director who was appointed by the 
President with the advice and consent of the Senate to a non-
renewable seven-year term.277 Nothing was said about removal. Byrd’s 
bill would have taken the director out from under the supervision of 
the Attorney General.278 
The same day as Byrd acted Democratic Senator Henry “Scoop” 
Jackson of Washington, introduced a bill that left the FBI as a 
component of the DOJ, and granted the director a non-renewable 
fifteen-year term, after being appointed by the President with advice 
and consent of the Senate.279 The Jackson bill provided that the 
President could remove the director “for only the following reasons: 
permanent incapacity, neglect of duty, malfeasance in office, any 
felony or conduct involving moral turpitude.”280 
The next month, Senator Richard Schweiker, a progressive 
Pennsylvania Republican, introduced a third FBI reform bill. Like 
Byrd’s bill, it too made the FBI a separate “independent” agency.281 
Like Jackson’s, it restricted removal.282 The removal section had a 
proviso that “[f]ailure to follow a directive from any member of the 
executive branch or legislative branch shall not constitute grounds for 
removal from office unless such failure constitutes a dereliction of the 
lawful duties of the Director or Deputy Director.”283 Appointment was 
by the President with Senate advice and consent. Splitting the 
difference between Byrd’s seven years and Jackson’s fifteen, Schweiker 
proposed that the director serve a non-renewable ten-year term.284 
The Senate Judiciary Committee rejected these proposals, however, 
except for the idea of giving the director a single, lengthy, non-
renewable term. There were two prominent reasons why it was 
reluctant to directly insulate the director from removal. One was the 
desire to prevent another Hoover — an effectively unremovable 
director who amassed power over time and abused the office.285 The 
Constitution was a second reason that a statutory limit on the 
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President’s removal authority was rejected by the Senate. Under 
Supreme Court precedent, the Committee thought it “highly likely” 
that the FBI Director was “within the class of officials subject to the 
President’s illimitable power of removal.”286 The Myers case from 1926 
rejected any congressional participation in the removal of high-
ranking executive officers as unconstitutional restraints on the 
“executive power” granted by Article II.287 And the Humphrey’s 
Executor case from 1935 only partially qualified that rule. It upheld 
good-cause removal restrictions for the commissioners heading the 
Federal Trade Commission, which had “quasi-legislative” (rule-
making) and “quasi-judicial” (adjudicative) powers, in addition to 
powers to investigate and prosecute civilly violations of federal law.288 
But the Court held that Congress could not restrict the President’s 
right to remove any “purely executive” officers.289 Believing that the 
FBI Director exercised “purely executive” powers, Congress gave the 
FBI Director a non-renewable ten-year term but did not attempt to 
legislate any removal restrictions.290 It was thought that the long term 
in office, spanning more years than a single President could serve, 
would sufficiently insulate the FBI Director from too much White 
House control.291 
Statutory restrictions on the removal of the FBI Director continued 
to be proposed through the end of the Carter presidency, but none 
became law. For instance, in 1980 Senate Republicans, including 
Orrin Hatch of Utah and Paul Laxalt of Nevada, introduced a bill to 
establish a legislative charter for the FBI, which would have created a 
comprehensive set of rules governing what the FBI could and could 
 
 286 Id. at 6. 
 287 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 163-64 (1926). The statute at issue 
provided: “Postmasters of the first, second and third classes shall be appointed and 
may be removed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, 
and shall hold their offices for four years unless sooner removed or suspended 
according to law.” Id. at 107. 
 288 Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 628-29 (1935). 
 289 Id. at 628, 631-32. 
 290 See Andrew Kent, Susan Hennessey & Matthew Kahn, Why Did Congress Set a 
Ten-Year Term for the FBI Director?, LAWFARE (May 17, 2017, 4:45 PM), 
www.lawfareblog.com/why-did-congress-set-ten-year-term-fbi-director [hereinafter 
Why Did Congress Set a Ten-Year Term]; see also Crime Control Act of 1976, Pub. L. 
No. 94-503, § 203, 90 Stat. 2407, 2427 (“[T]he term of service of the Director of the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation shall be ten years. A Director may not serve more than 
one ten-year term.”).  
 291 See Kent, Hennessey & Kahn, Why Did Congress Set a Ten-Year Term, supra 
note 290. 
  
2019] Congress and the Independence of Federal Law Enforcement 1985 
not do.292 The bill left the director to be appointed to a ten-year term 
by the President with advice and consent of the Senate, but specified 
that removal could occur “only for gross neglect of the duties of the 
office or malfeasance in office.”293 
As a result of the decision by Congress in the 1970s not to impose 
removal restrictions, it has been only norms of FBI independence that 
have prevented Presidents from treating the director like an at-will 
employee.294 
2. Constitutionality of Removal Restrictions 
If Congress wanted to take dramatic action to protect the FBI from 
White House interference, it could adopt a version of the Jackson, 
Schweiker or Hatch/Laxalt proposals — barring the President from 
removing the director except for good cause. Was the Senate Judiciary 
Committee in the 1970s correct that this would be unconstitutional? 
There is a vast literature on presidential versus congressional control 
over removal of senior executive officials. This Article will not attempt 
a comprehensive resolution of this debate, but will instead sketch an 
argument for the constitutionality of a removal restriction, while 
noting places where the contrary argument is strongest. 
I will address the following components of constitutional argument: 
text and original understanding, customary practice of the government 
over time, and Supreme Court doctrine. 
a. Text and Original Understanding 
Besides the impeachment mechanism, there is no express provision 
in the Constitution granting a power to remove executive officers. 
Removal of executive officials was not discussed during the 
Philadelphia Convention,295 but received extensive consideration early 
in the First Congress, in a great debate later known later as the 
“Decision of 1789.”296 The variety of views expressed was wide — 
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ranging from total presidential control, to shared power between the 
President and Senate, to congressional control via the Necessary and 
Proper Clause.297 Ultimately, by narrow margins in both Houses, a bill 
was passed which has been commonly — but not universally — 
understood to express the view that the default power to remove 
executive officials lies with the President, not the Senate nor the 
President plus Senate acting jointly. All agreed that removal is also 
possible by impeachment.298 No definitive view was expressed on 
Congress’s ability to qualify or limit removal. In the antebellum 
period, the Supreme Court noted the “great diversity of opinion” 
expressed during the 1789 debate, and accepted Congress’s “practical 
construction of the Constitution” holding that the power to remove 
(except via impeachment) executive officers appointed by the 
President with the advice and consent of the Senate is “vested in the 
President alone.”299 
Some scholars, including Steven Calabresi, Christopher Yoo, and 
Saikrishna Prakash, have advanced a view of the text, structure, and 
original understanding of the Constitution that is called the “unitary 
executive” theory. As Gillian Metzger recently explained, “[u]nitary 
executive scholars claim that Article II’s hierarchy requires broad 
presidential authority to control all executive-branch decisionmaking 
or at least at-will presidential removal power over those executing 
federal law.”300 As noted above, this view was by no means universally 
held among members of the Founding generation. 
Some scholars opposed to the unitary executive view, including 
Cass Sunstein, Larry Lessig, and Harold Krent, have contended that 
federal criminal prosecutions in the early Republic were not under the 
hierarchical control of the President.301 Unitary executive scholarship 
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has rebutted this to some extent, showing that Presidents Washington, 
Adams, and Jefferson expressed and acted on a belief that federal 
criminal prosecutors (federal district attorneys) answered to them, 
were removable from office at will, and could have their prosecutorial 
discretion overridden by the President.302 This practical construction 
of the Constitution by early Presidents is certainly entitled to great 
weight in assessing the original understanding. Out of deference to 
this history, as well as for reasons of policy,303 this Article does not 
propose any restrictions on the President’s power to remove the 
Attorney General or U.S. Attorneys. 
But the FBI Director has no power to prosecute, and thus may be 
differently situated as a constitutional matter. The FBI investigates 
crimes and gathers intelligence. No scholar has comprehensively 
examined whether the criminal investigation function was understood 
by the Founding generation to be within the illimitable control of the 
President. Following Justice Scalia, the leading proponent of unitary 
executive views, the assumption has been that investigation has the 
same constitutional status as prosecution. Scalia’s famous dissent in 
the independent counsel case, Morrison v. Olson, stated that “the 
conduct of a criminal prosecution (and of an investigation to decide 
whether to prosecute)” is an exercise of “purely” and “quintessentially 
executive activity.”304 Those functions, he wrote, had “always and 
everywhere — if conducted by government at all — been conducted 
never by the legislature, never by the courts, and always by the 
executive.”305 
As to criminal investigation, at least, Justice Scalia was mistaken. In 
England, the American colonies, and the American states post-1776, 
criminal investigation functions were performed by a mix of private 
individuals, grand juries (private individuals serving temporarily 
under judicial supervision), judicial officers, and traditional law 
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enforcement officers who would be considered “executive.”306 The 
executive officers were probably the least important of the bunch in 
terms of investigative functions. Nothing resembling a modern police 
agency existed. Thus, when the Constitution conveyed “executive 
power” to the President, it is unlikely that this was understood by the 
Founding generation to grant the President comprehensive, illimitable 
authority over all persons investigating federal crimes. And in fact, the 
English-colonial model continued for some time under the new federal 
government. In the early Republic period, a mix of private individuals 
(witnesses, crime victims, or relatives of crime victims), grand jurors, 
federal and state judges, qui tam relators, and state and federal 
executive officers participated in the investigation of federal crimes.307 
Only federal executive officers were removable by the President, or by 
someone who was an at-will employee of the President. 
b. Customary Practice 
Since its creation, the head of the FBI has been removable at-will — 
as a formal legal matter — by first the Attorney General and now the 
President.308 What constitutional weight this longstanding practice has 
is somewhat uncertain, however. Because notwithstanding the formal 
ability to fire for any reason, in practice Presidents have been greatly 
constrained in their ability to remove the director. Director Hoover 
was insulated in office by his popularity with the public and his 
perceived possession of derogatory information on Presidents, 
members of Congress, and others and his perceived willingness to 
blackmail.309 Since Hoover, a different type of independence has 
pertained. As noted above, a strong norm has developed that the FBI 
Director should be responsive to broad policy priorities of the 
President and Attorney General but independent when carrying out 
specific functions of the Bureau.310 Freedom from partisan political 
direction has gone without saying in the years since Watergate. 
Since Hoover’s death, every confirmation hearing for a permanent 
FBI Director has featured Senators and the nominees insisting that the 
FBI remain an independent, professional, nonpartisan agency.311 
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Frequently, nominees have stated that they sought and received 
assurances from the President and Attorney General, before agreeing 
to take the job, that they would have substantial independence.312 At 
one FBI Director confirmation hearing, a senator suggested that the 
director was so independent of the President that he “cannot be 
removed except for cause.”313 
Prior to President Trump removing Comey, only one Senate-
confirmed director had been removed from office. After an extensive 
administrative investigation initiated by the DOJ under President H.W. 
Bush, President Clinton fired William Sessions because of accusations 
of financial impropriety.314 
Moreover, notwithstanding formal legal freedom to nominate 
anyone they want for the job, Presidents since Nixon have selected 
widely-respected, nonpartisan figures with substantial backgrounds in 
law enforcement, as prosecutors or on the bench.315 
All of this, as well as the backlash to the Comey firing, suggests that 
political elites are broadly comfortable with the idea that the FBI be 
headed by a director who is substantially independent from 
presidential control. Whether or not this norm should, as a formal 
matter, influence the analysis of the constitutionality of a statutory for-
cause removal restriction,316 as a practical matter judges seem likely to 
be influenced by such a widespread norm. 
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c. Supreme Court Doctrine 
During the 1970s, it appeared clear that Supreme Court precedent 
would have barred a statutory for-cause restriction on removing the 
FBI Director. As described above, the doctrine of the Myers and 
Humphrey’s Executor cases appeared to be that the removal of “purely 
executive” officials cannot be restricted by Congress, but that 
Congress could require good-cause for the removal of the heads of 
independent regulatory commissions exercising quasi-legislative, 
quasi-judicial, and executive powers.317 The Court’s reasoning for this 
distinction was somewhat obscure. Myers had emphasized the 
President’s duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, and 
his or her need for accountability and control over subordinates who 
assisted in law execution.318 
Over the twentieth century, the powers delegated to independent 
regulatory agencies continued to grow. Agencies with for-cause 
removal protections for their heads have come to exercise significant 
powers of investigation and civil prosecution.319 It has remained 
conceptually unclear why conjoining law execution with rule-making 
and adjudication functions within the same agency should diminish 
the President’s removal power. Humphrey’s Executor did not purport to 
explain this. And since the Constitution does not make any distinction 
in Article II between civil and criminal law execution, the precedent of 
these independent regulatory agencies — and the widespread view by 
political and legal elites of their constitutionality320 — supports an 
argument that there could be some for-cause removal protection for an 
agency head with criminal investigative jurisdiction. 
A half-century after Humphrey’s Executor, the Court in Morrison v. 
Olson moved away from congressional intent to create a “quasi-
legislative” or “quasi-judicial” agency as the touchstone for the 
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constitutionality of removal restrictions. Morrison challenged the 
constitutionality of the independent counsel provisions of the Ethics 
in Government Act of 1978.321 This act was passed to address Nixon’s 
interference with the Watergate criminal investigation.322 His 
interference included the infamous Saturday Night Massacre, in which 
Nixon fired the Attorney General and his deputy in order to find a 
DOJ official (third in line Robert Bork) who was willing to fire special 
counsel Archibald Cox. Cox had been appointed by the Attorney 
General under newly-created DOJ regulations to oversee the criminal 
investigation.323 
The 1978 Act provided for the appointment of an independent 
counsel to investigate and, if deemed necessary, prosecute high-
ranking government officials — the President, Vice President, many 
executive agency heads, senior White House and DOJ officials — 
credibly accused of federal criminal wrongdoing.324 The Attorney 
General was required by the Act to conduct a preliminary 
investigation and, if he or she found “reasonable grounds” for 
additional investigation or prosecution, refer the matter to a specially-
constituted panel of judges of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit, who would appoint and define the 
jurisdiction of an independent counsel.325 This independent counsel 
would then have the full statutory authority of the Attorney General 
and DOJ with regard to the matters within his or her jurisdiction.326 
The counsel could be removed “only” by impeachment or “by the 
personal action of the Attorney General and only for good cause, 
physical or mental disability . . . or any other condition that 
substantially impairs the performance of such independent counsel’s 
duties.”327 Judicial review of removal by the Attorney General was 
authorized.328 
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The Court by a vote of 7–1, with Justice Kennedy not participating 
and Justice Scalia dissenting, upheld this statutory scheme in the face 
of a variety of constitutional challenges on separation of powers 
grounds. The Court upheld the appointment by reasoning that the 
independent counsel was an inferior officer who, under the 
Appointments Clause, could be appointed by either a department head 
or by “the Courts of Law.”329 The counsel’s inferior officer status was 
shown by, inter alia, being “subject to removal by a higher Executive 
Branch official,” having only “certain, limited duties,” “limited in 
jurisdiction,” “limited in tenure,” and no “authority to formulate 
policy for the Government or the Executive Branch.”330 
The statute’s prevention of the President from having any 
supervisory role or removal authority required more discussion. All 
justices assumed that investigating and prosecuting violations of 
federal crimes were core “executive” functions.331 The Morrison Court 
then simply rejected the apparent holding of Humphrey’s Executor that 
only officials exercising “quasi-legislative” or “quasi-judicial” 
functions could be protected by statutory good-cause removal rules.332 
The test, the Court held, should be instead whether good-cause 
removal limitations for an official, even one exercising “purely 
executive” powers, would still allow the President “to accomplish his 
constitutional role.”333 According to the Court, “the real question is 
whether the removal restrictions are of such a nature that they impede 
the President’s ability to perform his constitutional duty” to faithfully 
execute the law.334 Several considerations were mentioned to support 
the judgment that the statute was not unconstitutional: the limited 
powers, jurisdiction, and tenure of the independent counsel; the fact 
that the Attorney General, who could remove the independent counsel 
for good cause, was an at-will employee of the President; and the fact 
that the Court had long tolerated under Humphrey’s Executor 
independent agency “exercise [of] civil enforcement powers that are 
analogous to the prosecutorial powers wielded by an independent 
counsel.”335 Looming in the background for many justices must have 
 
 329 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 670-72 (1988) (discussing U.S. CONST. art. II, 
§ 2, cl. 2). 
 330 Id. at 671-72. 
 331 Id. at 688-89, 692, 705-06 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
 332 Id. at 689.  
 333 Id. at 690. 
 334 Id. at 691-92. 
 335 Id. at 691-92, 692 n.31. 
  
2019] Congress and the Independence of Federal Law Enforcement 1993 
been the judgment that Congress’s motives were reasonable and even 
laudable in light of the experiences of Watergate. 
On the question whether the limits on the President’s supervision of 
an inferior officer exercising purely executive functions violated the 
separation of powers, the Court placed great weight on the fact that 
Congress was not here trying to “increase its own powers at the 
expense of the Executive Branch.”336 Framing the question as whether 
the President’s power to execute the laws was “unduly interfer[ed]” 
with by the Act, the Court answered no. High-level executive branch 
superintendence was still available through the Attorney General, and 
indirectly by the President via his authority over the Attorney 
General.337 
Justice Scalia’s famous dissent argued that “the conduct of a criminal 
prosecution (and of an investigation to decide whether to prosecute)” 
is an exercise of “purely” and “quintessentially executive activity.”338 
(As noted above, this is historically incorrect with regard to criminal 
investigation and, perhaps, prosecution also.) The President’s Article 
II power and duty to execute the law could not be partially delegated 
away by Congress, wrote Scalia — the President must have “all of the 
executive power,” not “some of the executive power.”339 
Scalia also warned against the dangers posed by prosecutors with 
great resources being free from the political accountability. He thought 
it particularly likely that, as structured, an independent counsel might 
commit the great sin that Attorney General Jackson famously warned 
against: picking a defendant first and then searching for legal 
violations to charge, rather than neutrally looking at all legal 
violations and choosing the only most important and deserving to 
prosecute.340 
The Court has decided only one other removal case since Morrison. 
That decision, Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board, suggests greater formalism and commitment to 
unitary control of the executive branch by the President than seen in 
Morrison or Humphrey’s Executor, though the Court was careful to note 
that it was not reconsidering those decisions.341 In brief, Free 
Enterprise Fund involved the constitutionality of a double good-cause 
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removal structure. The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
(“PCAOB”), created by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, was an agency housed 
within the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), and given 
law execution, rule-making, and adjudicate authorities.342 Members of 
the Board governing PCAOB could only be removed by the SEC, and 
only then for willful violations of law or unreasonable failure to carry 
out Board duties.343 The litigating parties and the United States as 
amicus curiae all assumed that, although SEC commissioners lack 
statutory good-cause removal protection, the SEC was intended by 
Congress to be independent of presidential control and hence that 
good-cause removal restrictions should be implied.344 The Court 
accepted that assumption.345 
But this dual insulation from the President was fatal to the 
constitutionality of the removal restrictions on the Board.346 The Court 
stressed that the ability to remove subordinates was crucial to the 
President’s constitutional duty to execute the laws.347 The dual good-
cause structure prevented “[t]he President [from] hold[ing] the 
[Securities and Exchange] Commission fully accountable for the 
[Accounting] Board’s conduct [because he lacks] . . . the ability to 
oversee the Board, or to attribute the Board’s failings to those whom he 
can oversee.”348 The majority scoffed at Justice Breyer’s suggestion in 
dissent that there remained many practical means by which the SEC 
could effectively supervise and control the Board, and that this was 
sufficient to satisfy Article II’s requirements of presidential supervision 
of law execution.349 
Many commentators noticed the centrality the Free Enterprise Fund 
Court gave to the removal power as the key to presidential law 
execution power.350 Some have speculated that the majority was 
planting the seeds for future cutting-back of the leeway given to 
Congress by Morrison and Humphrey’s Executor.351 
The constitutionality of for-cause removal protection for the FBI 
Director is uncertain. If Morrison is good law, a functional approach 
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would be used, looking at whether the restriction unduly interfered 
with the President’s authority to take care to faithfully execute the 
laws. Since FBI Directors have operated for the last two generations 
with very substantial independence from the White House,352 and few 
major problems as a result, the answer might well be ‘no.’ 
But Morrison emphasized the independent counsel’s “limited 
duties,” “limited in jurisdiction,” and “limited in tenure”353 in 
upholding the removal restriction for an investigative and 
prosecutorial official. By contrast, the FBI Director has broad and 
important duties, a very wide jurisdiction, and (absent removal or 
impeachment) a ten-year tenure. FBI Directors have enormous power 
to do harm, and it could be argued that political accountability — via 
the elected President’s removal ability — is essential to keeping that 
power from being abused. 
In addition, Morrison might no longer be good law. Important 
scholars assert that it is not, and that Justice Scalia’s dissent has come 
to represent the best view of the law.354 At the risk of being overly 
reductionist, I think the major factor that has shifted opinions about 
Morrison is not necessarily any increased sympathy for strict unitary 
executive formalism, but rather the lived experience of Kenneth Starr-
Whitewater-Lewinsky, and other sprawling independent counsel 
investigations that seemed to have made proverbial mountains out of 
mole hills. Those experiences of Javert-like independent prosecutors 
in the 1980s and 1990s have eclipsed the memory of Watergate and 
the Saturday Night Massacre. Scalia’s warning about a prosecutor 
divorced from political accountability came to seem prescient. That is 
likely why Congress let the independent counsel statute lapse in 1999. 
But new experiences under President Trump will also shape — and are 
now shaping — the views of any judges who might decide in the 
future on the constitutionality of a statutory restriction on removal of 
the FBI Director. My guess is that the Trump experience will lead the 
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judiciary to be more tolerant of future congressional restrictions than 
it might have been otherwise. 
Congress might reduce concerns about an FBI Director being too 
independent of the President by reducing the term of office from the 
current ten years to something shorter, such as seven years — long 
enough to allow a director to learn the agency and implement 
programs and reforms, longer than any one presidential term, and an 
odd number of years so that an opening will be unlikely to coincide 
with a presidential election. 
CONCLUSION 
The options presented above are meant to be a menu to choose from 
à la carte, not a comprehensive program. Reasonable people can differ 
about what, if anything, Congress should do to bolster norms of law 
enforcement independence and neutrality that President Trump has 
assailed. Having spent a fair amount of time examining debates about 
this issue from the 1970s through the present, I thought I would close 
by suggesting what measures I think would be useful: 
• A pledge by the Senate that it will not approve nominees for 
FBI Director unless they make specific commitments on the 
record that they have been promised investigative 
independence by the President and Attorney General, and that 
they would reject as improper any attempts by the White 
House to interfere with FBI functions; 
• Congressional hearings and GAO investigation on whether the 
DOJ and FBI have improperly re-initiated criminally 
investigating Hillary Clinton or otherwise acted on improper 
partisan motives during the Trump administration; 
• Serious consideration of censuring or impeaching President 
Trump for obstructing justice in connection with the 
investigations of Michael Flynn, connections between Russia 
and the Trump campaign, and the firing of FBI Director 
Comey; 
• A statutory directive that the Attorney General promulgate 
regulations on White House-DOJ contacts that ensure, as far as 
possible, impartiality and independence of law enforcement; 
• Added duties for the DOJ Inspector General to investigate 
politicization of the Department; 
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• Statutory clarification that anyone serving as acting Attorney 
General must have previously been Senate-confirmed; 
• A statutory requirement that the Attorney General, Deputy 
Attorney General, U.S. Attorneys, and FBI Director have 
demonstrated “integrity, impartiality, and good judgment”; 
• A statutory requirement that the FBI Director and perhaps U.S. 
Attorneys also be appointed “without regard to political 
affiliation”; 
• A statutory requirement embodying something similar to the 
Bentsen amendment — barring political campaign aides and 
cronies of the President from serving as Attorney General or 
FBI Director; and 
• A statutory requirement that the President may not remove the 
FBI Director from office except for “good cause,” and shall 
transmit in writing a description of the good cause to House 
and Senate leaders within forty-eight hours, combined with 
reducing the term of office from ten to seven years. 
The normative desirability of some of these proposals, such as the 
removal restrictions for the FBI Director, turn on complex judgments 
about law, politics, and policy.355 As I said, reasonable people can 
differ on whether these or other measures by Congress would be 
advantageous. But I would hope there would be broad consensus that 
the independence and neutrality of federal law enforcement are values 
worth preserving, and that Congress should play a central role in 
articulating and protecting those values. 
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